



European Network of Councils  
for the Judiciary (ENCJ)

Réseau européen des Conseils  
de la Justice (RECJ)

# ENCJ Survey

## on the Independence of Judges

# 2022



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ENCJ 2022

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## Summary<sup>1</sup>

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The survey among the judges of Europe about their independence took place for the fourth time in the first quarter of 2022. In total 15,821 judges from 29 judiciaries of 27 countries participated. The target for participation was set at 20%, which most judiciaries (easily) achieved. The analysis of personal and professional characteristics in relation to perception of independence shows that per judiciary judges hold very similar views.

The main findings are:

1. Judges generally evaluate their independence positively. On a 10-point scale, judges rate the independence of the judges in their country on average between 7.0 and 9.8. They rate their personal independence even higher: between 7.5 and 9.9. It should be noted that Poland and Romania did not participate in the survey. Consistent with the positive assessment of independence, few judges report inappropriate pressure to influence judicial decisions.
2. Since 2015 when the first survey took place, independence is gradually improving on average for all judiciaries together. Based on the experience of judges that have been working for many years, also over a longer period independence has improved.
3. This does not mean that in all judiciaries independence has improved. There is much volatility especially in Central Europe. Recently, independence in Slovakia and Montenegro has deteriorated and, over a longer timespan, in Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. As the response rate in Slovakia was low, the outcomes for that country must be used with caution.
4. Judges rate the independence of councils on average per country between 2.7 and 9.6. The councils of Spain, Bulgaria and Slovakia get very low scores. Having a council is not enough to guarantee the independence of the judiciary as a whole. This depends highly on the arrangements, for instance, with regard to the appointment of the members of a council.
5. Corruption is an issue in several judiciaries. In a wider range of judiciaries, the judicial authorities are seen as not doing enough to address judicial misconduct and corruption.
6. In many judiciaries, judges are, as before, critical about human resource decisions concerning judges and, in particular, about appointment and promotion. In the view of respondents, appointment to the Supreme Court/Court of Cassation remains problematic in a variety of countries.
7. In most judiciaries, judges feel inappropriate pressure from the (social) media at case level. Many of them feel that their independence is not respected by/on the (social) media.
8. Court management including the court presidents generally do not try to influence the content of judicial decisions. Some judges experience, however, improper pressure by court management to meet timeliness standards, and more judges experience improper pressure from production targets. Caseload and court resources are a related concern in many countries.
9. The interaction of the judiciary with the other state powers is fraught with problems in many judiciaries. The survey highlights some of these problems: (1) the implementation by government of judicial decisions that go against the interest of government is often inadequate, (2) lack of respect for judicial independence by government and parliament is in many countries

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a big issue, according to the respondents, and (3) scarcity of resources provided by government affects independence.

Most of the judges in Europe are positive about their independence, but they still identify issues that affect their independence negatively. Some of these are at case level, others at system level, such as appointments. The survey provides many insights into the functioning of the judiciary at national level. It is up to the Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies to analyse the outcomes for their judiciaries and address the issues that are raised by the respondents. While Councils are dependent on the other state powers for improvement of legislation and for adequate resources, judiciaries and in particular Councils can address many issues by themselves.

The ENCJ promotes Councils to initiate a process of positive change. The outcomes of the survey stress the importance of concerted effort to initiate such change. Most of the issues raised in the survey are not new, and require higher priority to resolve. In addition, the dialogue must be sought or continued with the other state powers and also with the media to promote a better understanding of the importance of judicial independence for the functioning of society and its economy. The dataset of the survey is available on request.

## 1. Introduction

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Central to the mission of the ENCJ is the reinforcement of independent and accountable judiciaries in the European Union to guarantee access to fair, independent and impartial courts. To this end, the ENCJ is working systematically to develop standards and guidelines for the governance of the judiciary and the conduct of essential functions such as the appointment of judges. To assess the extent to which standards and guidelines are realised a set of indicators on independence and accountability has been developed and implemented. These indicators concern, on the one hand, the formal safeguards and mechanisms that protect judicial independence and provide for accountability and, on the other hand, the perceptions of independence in society. The judges are, obviously, important actors in this field. Their views are of particular interest, the more because they seldom express opinions. In the European Union, the perceptions of citizens and companies about judicial independence are annually surveyed by Eurobarometer. The data from these surveys are included in the indicators of independence and accountability. The perceptions of judges on independence are not part of these Eurobarometer surveys, and the ENCJ has taken upon itself to conduct a survey among judges on a regular basis.

In the first quarter of 2022, this survey was conducted for the fourth time. The survey asked judges to give a general assessment of their independence and to assess a range of aspects that affect independence. In addition to the actual functioning of the mechanisms that should safeguard independence, the survey asked the judges whether they felt the independence of the judge was respected by the diverse stakeholders of the judiciary, ranging from the governing bodies of the judiciary, the parties in procedures and their lawyers as well as the other two state powers and the (social) media. The survey also makes a cautious start with regard to the accountability of the judiciary.

Judges from 29 judiciaries of 27 countries participated in the survey, in total 15,821 judges. It should be noted that, as in the previous survey, Poland did not participate in the survey, because its Council for the Judiciary was expelled from the ENCJ. While Romania also did not participate, a record number of judiciaries and judges took part.

The results of the survey are presented here in figures and in tables. In section 2, the method and content of the survey are described and in section 3 the response rate and the characteristics of the respondents are given. The outcomes of the survey are presented in sections 4 – 11 in the form of figures. Annex 3 gives the outcomes in tables.

## 2. Method and content of the survey

First the method of the survey is described, and then the questions posed in the survey are presented.

### 2.1 Method

As in the previous waves of the survey, all judges of the participating judiciaries were invited to take part in the survey. The methodology of the survey was reviewed in 2021, and it was concluded that this is the best approach, given the need to guarantee that all opinions of judges get equal opportunity to be expressed, even under adverse conditions with regard to independence.<sup>2</sup> To check for (self) selection effects, the respondents were not only asked about personal characteristics (gender, experience as a judge), but also about type of court at which they are (primarily) working and type of cases they primarily adjudicate, as well as their membership of a judges' association.

As to the implementation of the survey, all members and observers of the ENCJ (i.e. councils for the judiciary and, where these do not exist, other governing bodies of the judiciary such as ministries of Justice) were asked to take part in the survey. The High Judicial and Presecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not being a member or observer of the ENCJ, asked to participate, and this was agreed. The participating governing bodies distributed a letter of introduction and a recommendation of the president of the ENCJ to all judges within their jurisdictions. The letter contained a link to the internet site of the ENCJ. The governing bodies translated the survey in their languages, and for each language a form was created that was made available on the ENCJ internet site (the platform used was SurveyMonkey). The respondents could fill in the survey online anonymously. They were only asked to specify the country in which they were working as a judge. Judges could fill in the survey in any language into which the survey had been translated.

Most councils distributed the letter of introduction directly to the judges. In the absence of centralized contact lists of judges, other councils had to send the letter to the court president who in his/her turn distributed the letter among the judges of his/her court. Some councils secured the endorsement and (practical) support of the judges' associations of their countries. The survey was addressed only to professional judges, and not to lay judges. A survey among lay judges was conducted separately in 2018.

The survey is dependent on the willingness and ability of Councils for the judiciary and other governance bodies to co-operate. In total 29 judiciaries from 27 countries participated in the survey (in the UK the judiciaries of England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland are distinguished).

### 2.2 Survey questions

The survey is designed in such a way that it asks judges to give a general assessment of their independence as they perceive it, in order to provide the data for the relevant Independence indicator (I13)<sup>3</sup>, but it also explores different aspects of independence in depth. In addition, respondents are asked about some personal characteristics (gender and experience) and their work (type of court and area of law) as well as, for the first time, their membership of a judges' association. The substantive questions are essentially the same as in the previous surveys, but some questions were added and a question was deleted. New questions concern the independence of Councils for the Judiciary, which was not adequately covered so far, and the perceived impact of the European Union on judicial

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<sup>2</sup> ENCJ (2021). Report 2020-2021 Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, Improving Indicators and surveys. [www.encj.eu](http://www.encj.eu).

<sup>3</sup> See ENCJ (2020). Report 2019-2020. Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary: Measuring for improvement. [www.encj.eu](http://www.encj.eu).

independence. The questions on the impact of working conditions on independence were restructured, and extended to include working hours and digitalization which has speeded up due to the Pandemic, and conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination. As to inappropriate pressure that court management may bring to bear on judges pressure to reach production targets was added as a category. A question on the transfer of judges to another court against their will was dropped, due to confusion about what constitutes a situation in which “against their will” would apply, and the very low frequency of the phenomenon.

Most questions were posed in the form of propositions. Unless indicated otherwise, answer categories were: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Not sure, Agree and Strongly agree. In the presentation of the results, the categories strongly disagree and disagree as well as strongly agree and agree are aggregated to make the figures and tables better readable. To rate independence, a scale from 0 to 10 was used. It should be noted that the survey contains a combination of questions about own experience and about perceptions. The choice for own experience or perceptions depends on the nature of the phenomenon at hand: if direct experience does not or cannot occur, only perceptions are relevant. Also, when a personal question cannot be expected to be answered honestly, a more general question is in order. With regard to the rating of independence, both experience and perceptions are used. Where relevant, the survey asks respondents to consider the last three years, since the previous survey in 2019.

The questions/statements that were used in the current survey are the following in logical order (in the survey, the order was not systematic).

### ***Independence***

#### **Overall perception of independence**

1. Rate the independence of the professional judges in your country on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").
2. Rate your own independence as a judge on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").
3. Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much.
4. Rate the independence of the Council for the judiciary on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").
5. I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively.

#### **Aspects of independence: implementation of judgments**

6. In the last three years, I believe judgements that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country.

#### **Aspects of independence: influence of the European Union**

7. I believe that the independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA.

### **Aspects of independence: inappropriate pressure in general**

8. During the last three years I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly and by whom: Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Court Management, Government, Media, Other judges (including an association of judges), Parliament, Parties and their lawyers, Prosecution, Social Media or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation.

### **Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure**

9. I believe that in my country during the last three years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly.

10. I believe during the last three years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.

11. During the last three years my decisions or actions have been directly affected by a claim, or a threat of a claim, for personal liability.

12. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio).

13. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, social media postings (for example, Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn).

### **Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure**

14. During the last three years I have been affected by a threat of, or actual, disciplinary or other official action because of how I have decided a case.

15. During the last three years the management of my court has exerted pressure on me to decide individual cases in a particular way.

16. During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to decide individual cases within a particular time.

17. During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to reach production targets (number of adjudicated cases).

18. During the last three years I have had to take decisions in accordance with guidelines developed by judges contrary to my professional opinion (guidelines do not include the obligation to follow precedent).

### **Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges**

19. I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

20. I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

21. I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years. (Note experience may include seniority).

**Aspects of independence: working conditions**

22. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: pay/pension/retirement age, working hours, case load, court resources, digitalisation and conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

**Accountability**

23. In my country, I believe that judges adhere to high ethical standards.

24. In my country, I believe that judicial misconduct is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

25. In my country, judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

**Respect for independence of judges**

26. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by: Association of Judges, Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Court Management incl. Court President, Government, Lawyers, Media (i.e. press, television or radio), Parliament, Parties in the trial, Prosecution, Social Media (for example Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn) and Supreme Court/Cassation.

**Personal and professional characteristics**

27. Gender

28. Judicial experience (years of service as a judge) in categories of years

29. Primary place of work (current): Court of first instance, Appeal Court or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation

30. Primary field of work (current): criminal cases, administrative cases, civil (including family) cases or all of these in equal measure

31. Membership of a judges' association

### 3. Response rate and characteristics of respondents

Judges from 29 judiciaries of 27 countries participated in the survey, in total 15,821 judges, a record number of judiciaries and record number of judges (27 judiciaries and 11,335 judges took part in the previous survey). The absolute number of respondents is given in *Figure 1*. *Figure 2* gives the response rate per country. An ambitious target was set at 20% responding judges (the target of the previous survey was 15%). This target was not reached in six countries. Still, the absolute number of respondents is deemed sufficient to retain all countries in the results, where only the outcomes for Slovakia and Italy need to be treated with extra caution.






Figure 1 Number of respondents



Note: the number of judges is based on CEPEJ data of total professional judges in 2018, and updated by Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies.

Figure 2 Response rate

### 3.1 Characteristics of respondents



Note: 10 respondents answered “identify otherwise” and 175 “I do not wish to answer the question”.

Figure 3 Gender of respondents




Figure 4 Length of judicial experience of respondents




Figure 5 Respondents by type of court




Figure 6 Respondents by type of case they primarily adjudicate




Figure 7 Respondents by membership of a Judges' association

The above figures show that differences exist among the judiciaries in the participation rates of groups of respondents. The most striking differences occur in the types of cases adjudicated (Figure 6) due to systematic differences in the degree of specialisation in areas of law. In Denmark and Norway nearly all judges adjudicate all types of cases, but also in Finland, Sweden, Greece, Ireland and parts of the UK many judges are generalists, while in the other judiciaries most judges handle one type of case. Countries differ also in the role played by judges' associations.


Whether it has added value to present the outcomes per category of the characteristics instead of totals, and/or to weigh the totals with participation rates of categories, depends on the differences between the outcomes for the categories of characteristics. In the Annex, the outcomes per characteristic are presented for the ratings of personal independence and the independence of the judges in general. The tables show that differences are small. In the previous survey, this was also discussed and the results of statistical tests were given. As now, small differences were found that were generally not significant, and only un-weighted outcomes for all judges together were presented. In this report, the same approach is followed. The statistical tests are not included, but are upon request available from the ENCJ office.

## 4. Overall perception of independence

In this Section, the independence scores are discussed with regard to judges and with regard to Councils for the Judiciary. In 4.1 the results for the present situation are discussed, while in 4.2 the development over time is examined by comparing the outcomes of the four surveys that been conducted since 2015 and in the present survey by the answers to the question on the experienced increase or decline of independence in combination with the length of experience as a judge.

### 4.1 Current state of independence

On a 10-point scale, respondents rate the independence of the judges in their judiciary on average between 7.0 and 9.8. Four countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia have scores of 7.2 or lower. The scores of eight countries are between 9 and 10. These countries are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK (England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland). See *Figure 8* which in addition to the scores per country gives the average of the (unweighted) country scores (red line). Respondents were also asked to rate their personal independence (*Figure 9*). These scores are generally substantially higher than the scores about the judges in general (0.6 point on average), with the difference increasing with the decrease of the score for all judges. While the two questions differ qualitatively (respondents may view the independence of all judges from a broader perspective than their personal independence, for instance, taking into account the selection of judges), self serving bias is likely to play some role.



*Figure 8 Independence of judges in general, scale 0 -10, where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10 means “highest possible degree of independence”*




Figure 9 Personal independence of judges, scale 0 -10 as above

Judges rate the independence of Councils for the Judiciary lower than their own independence or that of all judges, although the score is still positive on average (6.9). See Figure 10. Three judiciaries score very low: Spain (2.7), Slovakia (3.6) and Bulgaria (3.8). The highest scores are found in the UK where councils are advisory bodies. Most councils with large mandates, such as those of Denmark and the Netherlands, score between 7.0 and 8.0. Recently established councils in Finland and Ireland score higher. It should be noted that in the absence of councils often ministries of Justice fulfil the tasks of a council wholly or in part (see the ENCJ indicators, indicator Independence 2, Organizational autonomy of the judiciary<sup>4</sup>). Ministries of Justice are of course by definition not independent. Still, it is beyond doubt that the mere presence of a Council for the Judiciary does not guarantee the independence of the judiciary. This depends very much on actual arrangements, for instance, with regard to the appointment of members of a Council. At the same time, Councils with responsibilities for the governance of the judiciary including budgets cannot be fully independent from the other state powers.

A related question concerns, therefore, whether or not councils have appropriate mechanisms to protect judicial independence. See Figure 11. For reference, in the heading of this and each of the following figures the question (statement) posed in the survey is presented. Many respondents are uncertain about this (on average across countries 31% answer that they are unsure) or negative (23%), leaving 46% of the respondents believing councils have appropriate mechanisms.

<sup>4</sup> ENCJ (2020). Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary; measuring for improvement, ENCJ report 2019-2020.




Figure 10 Independence of the Council for the Judiciary, scale 0 -10, where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10 means “highest possible degree of independence”<sup>5</sup>





Figure 11 Mechanisms of Councils for the judiciary to defend judicial independence

<sup>5</sup> The Ministry of Justice of Estonia has asked specifically to include Estonia in this Table as well as in Tables 10 and 43. The ENCJ has not received a request for membership of the Network as yet.

## 4.2 Change over time of judicial independence

As the survey has been held four times, a comparison of judicial independence can be made over time since 2015. *Figure 12*, left side shows the average across all countries that participated, while *Figure 12* right side restricts the average to judiciaries that participated in 2017 and in 2022. The survey in 2015 had a lower participation (number of judiciaries and number of judges) than the subsequent surveys. Thus, *Figure 12*, right side provides a more precise insight. Both figures show the same gradually upward trend.



*Figure 12* Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average of judiciaries.

*Figure 13* gives the independence scores per judiciary. As not all countries participated in each survey, there are gaps in the data. The outcomes show distinct patterns. Some judiciaries such as Denmark have a stable (high) level of independence, while others show much more volatility, probably reflecting political developments.




Figure 13 Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average per judiciary




Figure 13 Continued Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average per judiciary

Taking a longer perspective, judges were asked in the survey whether their independence has increased or decreased since they started working as a judge. These answers can be meaningfully combined with the years of experience judges have (see above Figure 4). Figure 14 presents the outcomes for all judiciaries together. It gives the percentage of respondents that experienced a large improvement or large decline of their independence, broken down for years of experience. This means that in this figure respondents that experienced small or no changes are not visible. The gradual improvement of independence since 2015 is visible in the experience of judges appointed in the last ten years. Judges that started more than 25 years ago report a (net) strong improvement of independence. The experience of judges with inbetween appointments suggests that the progression of independence is not linear.




Figure 14 Change of independence since start as a judge by years of experience; average of all judiciaries. Percentage of respondents that report that their independence has improved or declined much.

Figure 15 gives the results for each country separately. At the national judiciary level, most countries show the largest improvements for both the judges with the longest and the shortest experience. For a substantial number of judiciaries, the outcomes differ from those of the previous survey. In the last survey, a pattern of large improvement over the last 25 years - with frequent emphasis on the earlier periods - was found for nearly all countries of Central Europe. The developments in the southern, western and northern parts of Europe were rather ambivalent. Now, this pattern is reversed with generally positive developments in the latter parts of Europe and more ambivalent outcomes for the judiciaries of Central Europe. While most of these judiciaries still report positive change, judges in Hungary and Slovakia are negative about the change in independence and in Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia positive and negative experiences are balanced.

The differences between this survey and the previous survey indicate that recent experience has a large impact on the evaluation made by the respondents. In particular, Slovakia is a case in point. Whether this leads to an overemphasis of recent experience, is a matter for further research, in particular at the national level.




Figure 15 Change of independence since start as a judge by years of experience for each judiciary, percentage of respondents that report that their independence has improved or declined much



Figure 15 Continued Change of independence since start as a judge by years of experience for each judiciary, percentage of respondents that report that their independence has improved or declined much

## 5. Implementation of judicial decisions

As stressed in the report about the previous survey, independence cannot be separated from the authority of the judge.<sup>6</sup> When judicial decisions are not implemented, independence may be guaranteed in all respects to allow impartial judgments, but it has no practical value: independence presupposes that power resides in the judge. Therefore, implementation of judicial decisions can be seen as an important dimension of independence. In particular, governments have the ability to ignore judicial decisions or, at least, delay implementation. In the survey, judges were asked to give their assessment of the implementation by the government of judicial decisions that go against the interests of that government. As the high percentage of not-sure answers (mean across countries is 30%) indicates, this question is difficult to answer. On average across countries, 51% of judges agree with the statement that judgments against the interests of the government are usually executed (*Figure 16*). The variation between countries is very large. Percentages range from a meagre 18% in Lithuania to 83% in Ireland. In Cyprus 47% and in Italy 44% of the respondents actually believe that such judgments are usually not implemented.





Figure 16 Implementation by government of judgments against the interests of government

<sup>6</sup> J. Rios-Figueroa and J.K. Stanton (2012), An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 30/1 p 104-137.

## 5.1 Perceptions of independence and implementation of decisions

If judicial independence and implementation of judicial decisions by government together define the position of the judiciary in the trias politica, it is of interest how these two dimensions are related. In *Figure 17* the independence score (all judges) is on the horizontal axis, while the implementation of judicial decisions by government is on the vertical axis. The correlation of both dimensions is strong (correlation coefficient is 0.75), but some countries show divergent combinations. For instance, Cyprus is an extreme case, but Italy and Denmark have (relatively) high scores on independence, but relatively low scores on implementation.



*Figure 17* Judicial independence versus implementation of judicial decisions by government.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Austria: AT, Belgium: BE, Bosnia and Herzegovina: BA, Bulgaria: BG, Croatia: HR, Czeckia: CZ, Denmark: DK, Germany: DE, England and Wales: EW, Greece: EL, Finland: FI, Hungary: HU, Ireland: IE, Italy: IT, Latvia: LV, Lithuania: LT, Montenegro: ME, Northern Ireland: NI, Netherlands: NL, Norway: NO, Portugal: PT, Scotland: SC, Slovakia: SK, Slovenia: SI, Spain: ES, Sweden: SE.

## 6. Independence in relation to the European Union

A new question in the survey concerns the impact of the European Union and the European Economic Association in the case of Norway on the independence of the Judiciary. This question is not relevant anymore for the United Kingdom, and results for these judiciaries are not given. Across all judiciaries, 61% of the respondents believe that their independence has been strengthened by being part of the EU (and EEA) or the prospect of becoming part of the EU. Relatively low scores are found in the Nordic countries, where more than in other judiciaries judges are uncertain of the impact of the EU. Obviously, in these judiciaries there is not much to improve with respect to independence, but other factors may play a role as well.




Figure 18 Influence of the European Union on judicial independence

## 7. Aspects of independence: case related

The vast majority of judges in Europe do not experience inappropriate pressure to influence their decisions in judicial procedures (*Figure 19*). Across all countries, 5% of the judges report inappropriate pressure with less than 1% reporting that this happens regularly. Uncertainty does not play a role here (only 3% answers to be unsure). Percentages of 10% and higher are reported for Slovakia (16%) and Latvia (16%). The fact that judges are under inappropriate pressure does not mean, of course, that they yield to that pressure. When judges experience inappropriate pressure, the most given answers - across all countries - as to who exerts this pressure are court management and the parties and their lawyers. In Slovakia and Latvia, it is, however, the (social) media and government.




Figure 19 Inappropriate pressure on judges

### 7.1 External pressure

Turning to external pressure, *Figure 20* concerns the occurrence of corruption in the judiciary, focused on efforts to influence the outcome of court cases. The question concerns the prevalence of corruption within the judiciary and not personal experience. While 10% of the respondents believe corruption occurs on average across all judiciaries, only 1% believes this occurs regularly and 4% occasionally. The remaining 5% answers “very rarely”. As in the previous surveys, three categories of countries can be distinguished: (1) judiciaries in which nearly all judges (96% or more) are sure that corruption does not occur. Countries are Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the three judiciaries of the UK. (2) Judiciaries in which a small percentage of judges (5% or less) believes that corruption occurs, and 8% - 15% is not sure. Austria, Belgium, France and Germany fall into this category. And (3) judiciaries in which a higher percentage believes that corruption occurs (6% - 36%) and more than 15% (up to 51%) are uncertain. The fact that judges are uncertain about the occurrence of corruption is a bad sign in itself. On the positive side: when judges believe that corruption occurs, they seldom believe this to happen regularly. Italy is an extreme case: 41% believes corruption occurs, but 26% (% point) believes this happens very rarely. The countries for which the most judges report that

corruption occurs regularly or occasionally are: Bosnia and Herzegovina (16%), Bulgaria (16%), Italy (15%), Croatia (14%), Lithuania (13%) and Slovenia (11%).




Figure 20 Judicial corruption




Figure 21 Allocation of cases to judges

The outcome of cases can be influenced by the case allocation. The allocation of specific cases to specific judges, if the allocation mechanism allows for discretionary decisions by, for instance, court management, can determine the outcome of these cases in foreseeable ways. This may be brought about by external pressure, and is a potential inroad for corruption. In particular, many judges in Portugal (27%) and Spain (26%) believe this to happen in their judiciaries, while similar percentages are not sure about this (Figure 21). But this phenomenon seems to be broader, as in Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France and Greece percentages are above 10%.

External pressure can also take the form of claims for personal liability. Figure 22 shows that, while not negligible, claims are not a big issue in the eyes of the respondents.




Figure 22 Personal liability

More important sources of external influence on decisions are the media and social media. Many judges see an inappropriate impact on judicial decisions. What is to be understood by inappropriate, is left open in the survey. The impact of the media on decisions of judges is large in most countries. In the Nordic countries (Scandinavia and Finland), Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, under 10% of judges believes this impact to exist. The highest percentages occur for Slovakia (60%), Croatia (53%), Portugal (40%), Bulgaria (36%), Latvia (35%) and Lithuania (35%). The impact of social media is seen as inappropriate by less respondents, but still 51% in Slovakia, 37% in Croatia and 22% in Portugal. The relationship with the (social) media is further discussed below.




Figure 23 Influence of the media on judicial decisions




Figure 24 Influence of social media on judicial decisions

## 7.2 Internal pressure

Turning to internal pressure, *Figure 25* presents the pressure judges experience when deciding cases as a result of (the threat of) disciplinary procedures. In most judiciaries, some respondents felt this pressure personally. Pressure is particularly frequent in Latvia (17%) and Slovakia (15%), while in nine countries more than 5% of the respondents have this experience.




Figure 25 Disciplinary action

Above, inappropriate pressure on judges from several sources, including court management, was discussed. *Figures 26, 27 and 28* differentiate the influence of court management by examining separately the always inappropriate influence on the content of judicial decisions, inappropriate influence on the timeliness of decisions and inappropriate influence to reach productions targets. Influence on the content of decisions is rare. Only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia and Montenegro more than 5% of the respondents actually report that such pressure has been exerted on them personally. As to timeliness, pressure that is perceived to be inappropriate occurs much more often. For 12 judiciaries the percentage of judges that experience inappropriate pressure is well above 10%. These judiciaries are diverse. For instance, in both Portugal and Estonia 15% of the respondents report such pressure. Pressure that is considered to be inappropriate by the respondents is even higher with respect to production targets. In all judiciaries, at least 5% of the respondents experience such pressure, and in 15 judiciaries more than 15%. The highest percentages are found for France (34%) and Spain (35%) and the lowest in Bulgaria (6%), Denmark (6%), Ireland (5%), the Netherlands (7%) and Norway (8%). The average for all judiciaries progresses from 3% for inappropriate influence of court management on decisions, to 10% on timeliness and 16% on production targets.




Figure 26 Inappropriate pressure of court management: content of decisions




Figure 27 Inappropriate pressure of court management: timeliness




Figure 28 Inappropriate pressure of court management: production targets

Influence that is felt to be inappropriate may also be exerted among the judges themselves. In the survey, this is covered by a question concerning the impact of guidelines developed by judges. Note that such guidelines do not include the obligation to follow precedent. Guidelines that promote the uniform interpretation of (procedural) law may go against the professional opinion of individual judges, but they still may feel bound to comply. From the perspective of independence this is undesirable. Figure 29 shows that this tension is actually widespread in Central Europe, but also occurs, for instance, in England and Wales and Italy. In most other judiciaries more unanimity seems to exist about guidelines.




Figure 29 Impact of guidelines on independence

### 7.3 Internal and external pressure on adjudication

Figure 30 combines internal and external pressure. Inappropriate pressure to meet productions targets is used as indicator for internal pressure and improper media influence for external pressure. it appears that a judiciary that is vulnerable to external pressure is generally also internally vulnerable. Conversely, low external pressure is accompanied by low internal pressure. Correlation is relatively high (0.65).




Figure 30 Absence of internal influence (no inappropriate pressure from production targets) vs absence of external influence on case handling (no improper influence of the media)

## 8. Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

Human resource decisions about judges form a key area of independence, and belong often to the primary tasks of a Council for the Judiciary. In the survey, a distinction is made between first appointment to the first and second instance courts, appointment to the Supreme Court / Court of Cassation and promotion to other positions in the first and second instance courts, as the procedures for appointment are generally very different. *Figures 31, 32 and 33* present the outcomes. *Figure 31* concerns first appointment to the judiciary and addresses the issue whether appointment is solely based on ability and experience. Only in a few judiciaries more than 90% of the respondents believe this is the case (Denmark, Netherlands and Northern Ireland) with few respondents being uncertain. In other judiciaries this belief does not exist, with at the maximum 35% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 39% in Croatia, 42% in Hungary and 32% in Bulgaria expressing the opposite, with in addition many respondents being unsure.

As to appointment to the Supreme Court / Court of Cassation, the percentages are worse for many judiciaries. 65% of the respondents from Spain and 52% from Hungary express the view that these appointments are not only based on ability and experience, but, for instance, also in Germany (34%), Italy (36%) and Portugal (38%) percentages are high.

Promotion of judges at the first instance and appeal courts draws also more negative replies than first appointments (*Figure 33*). Only Denmark scores very favourably on this, followed by Northern Ireland and Netherlands. The results show that promotion is difficult to organise in such a way that it is only based on ability and experience, and that it is actually recognized as such by the judges. The point has been made in comments on previous surveys that negative opinions about promotion may be dominated or strengthened by judges that were not selected for promotion. While disgruntled response may play a role, this is likely to be relevant in particular where procedures are not perceived to be transparent and objective, and thus it does not detract from the relevance of the answers.

Appointment and promotion remain major issues to be addressed in nearly all judiciaries.




Figure 31 First appointment of judges




Figure 32 Appointment to supreme court/court of cassation




Figure 33 Promotion of judges

## 9. Aspects of independence: working conditions

The way judges are able to adjudicate cases may also depend on their working conditions. Judges may be fully independent in the aspects described above, but if they, for instance, lack the resources to conduct procedures in the manner they deem necessary for a fair trial, independence comes to nothing. In the survey the respondents were therefore asked to give their opinion on several aspects of potential changes in their working conditions. The following figures deal with six aspects: (1) pay, pension and retirement age, (2) working hours, (3) case load, (4) court resources, (5) digitalization and (6) conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

Pay, pensions and retirement age varies in importance from not an issue at all (Denmark, Netherlands) to a major issue. Lithuania is an extreme case where 61% of the respondents see it as a factor that affects their independence. Working hours is less of an issue, but it is very important in Spain (47%), France (37%) and Lithuania (33%).




Figure 34 Impact of changes in working conditions: pay, pension and retirement age




Figure 35 Impact of changes in working conditions: working hours

Caseload is related to working hours with extreme outcomes for again Spain (54%), France (46%) and Lithuania (47%). Caseload is an issue in all countries, except for Czech Republic (3%), Denmark (5%), Netherlands (6%) and Norway (7%). Court resources is again a related issue. In 17 of the judiciaries more than 20% of the respondents believe their independence is negatively affected by the lack of resources of the court. Least affected judiciaries are those of Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands and Northern Ireland.




Figure 36 Impact of changes in working conditions: case load




Figure 37 Impact of change of working conditions: court resources

Digitalization which was added in response to the Covid 19 Pandemic is less of an issue, but still important. In 11 judiciaries, more than 15% of the respondents feel that digitalization affects their independence.

Finally, conduct at work (including sexual harassment and discrimination) is not recognized by many judges as a factor that influences independence. Still, it is mentioned, and in some judiciaries it is an important issue. Croatia stands out with 30% of the respondents, while more than 10% is found for Hungary (11%), France (12%), Latvia (13%) and Slovenia (13%).

The relative importance of the six factors constituting change in working conditions can be summarized by the average across judiciaries. This leads to the following ranking: 22% of the respondents see case load and court resources as having an impact on their independence, 17% pay, pensions and retirement age, 15% digitalization, 13% working hours and 7% conduct at work. From the survey, it is not clear whether and how these aspects may accumulate.




Figure 38 Impact of change in working conditions: digitalization




Figure 39 Impact of change in working conditions: conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination

## 10. Accountability

Figures 40, 41 and 42 address some important aspects of the accountability of the judiciary. The issues included in the survey are the adherence of judges to ethical standards and extent to which the judicial authorities address judicial misconduct and judicial corruption.

As to the behaviour of judges, the differences among judiciaries are relatively small. The average for all countries together is only 5% of respondents disagreeing with the proposition that judges adhere to high ethical standards, with high percentages for Italy (15%) and Greece (14%). Relatively few respondents (13%) are unsure about this.

With regard to the performance of the judicial authorities the outcomes are more negative and they differ much more among judiciaries. With regard to judicial misconduct, the average across all judiciaries is 11% of the respondents believing that the judicial authorities are not effective in addressing this issue, with much more respondents being uncertain (24%). For corruption, the means are 7% and 25%.

In Slovakia (30%), Spain (29%), France (29%), Slovenia (20%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (20%), 20% or more of the respondents feel that the authorities do not act effectively to address judicial misconduct. As to the effectiveness of policies against corruption, the worst outcomes are found for Bosnia and Herzegovina (30%), Croatia (22%), Bulgaria (21%) and Slovakia (21%).




Figure 40 Adherence by judges to high ethical standards




Figure 41 Handling of judicial misconduct by judicial authorities




Figure 42 Handling of judicial corruption by judicial authorities

## 11. Perceived Respect for judicial independence

The independence of judges is an important prerequisite for democracy based on the rule of law. The functioning of such a system depends very much on the effective interaction of the three state powers and, in particular, the respect they show for each others' roles. As to the judiciary this is foremost respect for the independence of the judiciary. The interaction of the state powers cannot be separated from the opinions of the citizens, in their role as voters but also as parties in judicial procedures. When citizens have the courts in high esteem, it is in the interest of parliament and government to act accordingly, and for instance implement court decisions that conflict with the interests of government.<sup>8</sup> Also, the role of the media and, increasingly, the social media cannot be neglected as intermediary of courts and citizens. In this section the outcomes are reported of questions on the perceptions of judges about the respect for judicial independence by a range of stakeholders. These perceptions are based on direct experience of judges in the courts or, where direct experience does take place, on out of court observation of behaviour of stakeholders. The stakeholders distinguished here are the judicial authorities, the parties to procedures and their legal representation, and the other state powers and the (social) media. The figures show that judges feel most respected by the judicial authorities and subsequently by the court users. Least positive are judges about the other state powers and the (social) media. This categorization is further discussed in Box 1.

### 11.1 Judicial authorities

The judicial authorities are defined here as the judicial governance bodies such as court management including the presidents of the courts, Councils for the Judiciary and the highest courts, consisting of the Supreme Courts and the Constitutional Courts. Also, the judges' associations are included. *Figures 43 - 47* present the outcomes. Respect for independence, as experienced by the judges, is generally high. This holds, in particular, for the highest courts, and to a somewhat lesser degree for the governance bodies. Councils for the Judiciary are seen as less supportive than the other bodies, but there are large differences among judiciaries, indicating that councils operate in different ways. While in several judiciaries around 20% of the respondents feel that councils do not respect independence, in the other judiciaries this is not an issue at all. In the mean, the experience of judges with court management is the same, but the spread among judiciaries is less than among the councils. It is remarkable that for all institutions Hungary stands out as less respectful for independence.

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<sup>8</sup> See for instance J.N. Krehbiel (2021), Public awareness and the behavior of unpopular courts. *British Journal of Political Science* 51, 1601-1619.




Figure 43 Respect for judicial independence by Councils of the Judiciary




Figure 44 Respect of judicial independence by court management




Figure 45 Respect of judicial independence by associations of judges




Figure 46 Respect of judicial independence by supreme court/court of cassation




Figure 47 Respect of judicial independence by constitutional court

### 11.2 Parties in procedures

In this category the parties in law suits, their lawyers, and, with regard to criminal procedures, the prosecutors are included (Figures 48, 49 and 50). The mean across judiciaries is higher for parties than for lawyers and prosecutors. For the latter, the outcomes resemble very much the outcomes for the judicial authorities. As to respect for independence by the parties, several judiciaries show adverse outcomes: 30% of the judges in Latvia and 26% in Slovenia feel that their independence is not respected, while percentages of 15% and higher are found in Croatia (18%), Italy (17%), Lithuania (17%) and Northern Ireland (15%). In combination with high percentages of unsure replies, this means that in Latvia only 25% and in Lithuania 46% of the judges feel respected, compared to an average of 72%. Lawyers and, as mentioned already, prosecutors are seen to be more respectful of independence than parties.




Figure 48 Respect for judicial independence by parties in procedures




Figure 49 Respect for judicial independence by lawyers




Figure 50 Respect for judicial independence by prosecutors

### 11.3 Other state powers and (social) media

The next four figures (Figures 51 - 54) give the results for Government, Parliament, the media and the social media. Judges are much less positive about the respect for independence by these actors. In the mean for all countries, 56% of the respondents answer that their independence is respected by government and 25% that it is not. These results mask a very large variety among judiciaries. The figures speak for themselves. Low respect for independence is not confined to a specific region. For instance, in France only 29% and in Lithuania only 26% of the respondents feel that their independence is respected by government. In Austria 39% and in England and Wales 40% feels this way. The outcomes for Parliament are very similar, while for the media these are more negative on average across countries and for specific countries. 10% of the judges of Lithuania and 18% of Slovakia, to mention the most extreme outcomes, perceive their independence respected by the media. At the other end of the spectrum, stand Norway and Denmark.

With regard to the social media, much more respondents are uncertain of the impact on independence. The percentage that does not feel their independence respected by the social media (27%) is nearly the same as for the media (28%) on average across countries. As a result, even fewer respondents feel support from the social media (36%) than from the media (49%).

### 11.4 Differences among categories

Respect for independence is, in the eyes of the respondents, highest among the court authorities, followed by the parties and their representatives and, at a large distance, the other state powers and the (social) media. Assuming, as mentioned before, that in a democracy the attitude of parliament and government is determined or at least influenced by the will of the people, one could, theoretically, expect that respect for independence by the parties in procedures would not differ much from respect by parliament and government. However, there is often a very large difference between the two, at least in the perception of the judges. An example of a judiciary where the differences are small is Norway

(93% of the respondents feels respected by the parties in procedure and 90% by government) with the other Nordic countries in a similar position. At the other end of the continuum, Latvia has similar outcomes for both categories (34%, 26%). There are several other countries that also have similar outcomes: for example, Germany (83%, 79%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (64%, 69%).

Other judiciaries show extreme differences. For instance, France (72%, 29%) and Hungary (77%, 46%), Slovakia (60%, 26%) and England and Wales (75%, 40%). This is not the place to examine the causes of these divergences, but it seems safe to conclude that the court and political “arenas” are quite different, and need to be reconciled. Where citizens in their role as parties in procedures respect the independence of the judiciary, a responsive government should do the same.




Figure 51 Respect for judicial independence by government




Figure 52 Respect for judicial independence by parliament




Figure 53 Respect for judicial independence by the media




Figure 54 Respect for judicial independence by social media

## BOX: Mapping “respect” for judicial independence

The survey provides rich data on judges’ perceptions of “respect” paid to their independence by various stakeholders (groups and institutions) in the countries covered.<sup>9</sup> A data dimensionality reduction technique, called *Principal Components Analysis* (PCA), can be applied, in order to draw “maps” grouping stakeholders according to the perceptions of the responding judges.

As PCA is just a technique aimed at uncovering patterns from the data, obtained results require interpretation, which could be more of an art than a science. Nevertheless, it conveys important – and previously unexplored – knowledge of the sources of both respect for and challenges to judicial independence.


This box introduces this analysis, using the example of six countries. These countries have been selected taking into account (i) a substantial number of responses that can be fed into the PCA, (ii) the coverage of different institutional designs and (iii) perceived threats to judicial independence.

Results are summarized as “maps” presenting the various stakeholders covered in the survey. The location of each stakeholder was determined by the PCA analysis (see details in the Annex 2).

Stakeholders, that are assessed by a majority of judges as “respecting” judicial independence, are represented by green bubbles (the size of the bubble denotes the share of judges that view the institution as “respecting” their independence). Stakeholders, that are assessed by a majority of judges as “not respecting” judicial independence, are represented by red bubbles (the size of the bubble denotes the share of judges that see the institution as not “respecting” independence).


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<sup>9</sup> Specifically, the relevant statement is phrased as follows: “*During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by*”, with a baseline list of 12 stakeholders: *Association of Judges; Constitutional Court; Council for the Judiciary; Court Management including Court President; Government; Lawyers; Media (i.e. press, television or radio); Parliament; Parties; Prosecution; Social Media (for example Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn); Supreme Court.*




**Bulgaria:**

The “map” plots distinct groups of stakeholders. First, private parties present in the courtroom (Parties and Lawyers, but not Prosecution), with a majority of judges perceiving them as respecting their independence. Second, political and media institutions (Media, Parliament and Government), with a majority of judges viewing them as not respectful of their independence. Third, institutional actors linked with the judiciary (Supreme and Constitutional Courts, Prosecution, Court Management and Council of the Judiciary(NCJ)). The Association of Judges landed at some distance. Typically, large majorities of judges view these institutions as respecting their independence, with divided opinions on the Bulgarian NCJ.




**France:**

Also in the case of France the “map” reveals clear clusters. However, the grouping slightly differs. First, private stakeholders present in the courtroom (Parties and Lawyers) are closer to the Prosecution which landed mid-way between them and the judicial institutions (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, NCJ, Association of Judges). Majorities of judges view them as respecting their independence, with most scepticism towards the private parties. The third cluster – perceived by a majority of judges as not respecting their independence – groups political and media institutions.




**Germany:**

The “map” plots a different constellation of the stakeholder groups. Like in France, those appearing in the courtroom can be classified as a group, with the Prosecution between the Parties and Lawyers and the judicial institutions. Importantly, the vast majority of judges assess all of them as respecting their independence. Political actors (Parliament and Government) are quite at a distance from the Media. Noteworthy, a majority of judges assess also this cluster of institutions as respecting their independence (with the biggest share of pessimists around the Social Media).




**Hungary:**

The “Map” generated by the responses of Hungarian judges differs from the other “maps”, as the actors linked with the judiciary are divided. On the one side, Court Management, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and Prosecution, landed in the proximity of the political institutions (Parliament and Government). Association of Judges and NCJ stand apart. This pattern can be explained by the clash between “illiberalism” and previous, liberal constitutional identity. Lawyers and Parties landed next to the Media – that emerged in unusual distance from the political institutions. Judges were divided in their views on the respect from political institutions (optimists slightly dominated) and media (pessimists slightly dominated).



**Netherlands:**

The “map” groups first actors appearing in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers and Prosecution), second Supreme Court and Association of Judges, third, Court Management and NCJ (this can be explained by the central role of the NCJ in managing the Dutch judiciary) and, fourth, media and political institutions. Just as in the case of Germany, the majority of judges assess all stakeholders as respectful of their independence, with the biggest scepticism towards Social Media. Government landed in noticeable distance from Parliament. Moreover, its respect towards judicial independence was seen as higher than that of Parliament.



**Spain:**

The “map” plots three distinct groups of stakeholders: those present in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers, Prosecution), institutional actors linked with the judiciary as before as well as public sphere institutions (Parliament, Government and the Media). About the last group, judges were divided in their assessment whether they respect or do not respect their independence (only for the Media pessimists outnumbered optimists). While stakeholders present in the courtroom and most judicial institutions are viewed by a majority of judges as respecting their independence, there is more scepticism around the NCJ.

## 12. Conclusions and Discussion

The survey was administered with success: many judiciaries and very many judges participated. Due to the decentralized nature of the judiciary, it requires an effort to bring the survey to the attention of all judges. The degree of success with this has a large influence on the response rate. Most judiciaries were willing to participate and were very successful in reaching the judges. As a result, the response rate went up in nearly all judiciaries. It is a pity that Romania did not participate this time, and that Italy and Slovakia fell behind in the effort to promote the survey. This led to a large decline of the response rate for these judiciaries. Irrespective of this, the survey gives an indepth insight in how the judges of all participating judiciaries perceive their independence, based on their, often long, experience. It should be noted that per judiciary the respondents hold similar views, irrespective of their personal and professional characteristics.

The report presents the outcomes of the survey without further quantitative analysis. An exception is made for the perceptions of judges on the respect for independence by a range of institutions. Box 1 contains an analysis of the “distance” between these institutions.

The main findings are:

1. Judges generally evaluate their independence positively. On a 10-point scale, judges rate the independence of the judges in their country on average between 7.0 and 9.8. They rate their personal independence even higher: between 7.5 and 9.9. It should be noted that Poland and Romania did not participate in the survey. Consistent with the positive assessment of independence, few judges report inappropriate pressure to influence judicial decisions.
2. Since 2015 when the first survey took place, independence is gradually improving on average for all judiciaries together. Based on the experience of judges that have been working for many years, also over a longer period independence has improved.
3. This does not mean that in all judiciaries independence has improved. There is much volatility especially in Central Europe. Recently, independence in Slovakia and Montenegro has deteriorated and, over a longer timespan, in Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia. As the response rate in Slovakia was low, the outcomes for that country must be used with caution.
4. Judges rate the independence of councils on average per country between 2.7 and 9.6. The councils of Spain, Bulgaria and Slovakia get very low scores. Having a council is not enough to guarantee the independence of the judiciary as a whole. This depends highly on the arrangements, for instance, with regard to the appointment of the members of a council.
5. Corruption is an issue in several judiciaries. In a wider range of judiciaries, the judicial authorities are seen as not doing enough to address judicial misconduct and corruption.
6. In many judiciaries, judges are, as before, critical about human resource decisions concerning judges and, in particular, about appointment and promotion. In the view of respondents, appointment to the Supreme Court/Court of Cassation remains problematic in a variety of countries.
7. In most judiciaries, judges feel inappropriate pressure from the (social) media at case level. Many of them feel that their independence is not respected by/on the (social) media.
8. Court management including the court presidents generally do not try to influence the content of judicial decisions. Some judges experience, however, improper pressure by court management to meet timeliness standards, and more judges experience improper pressure from production targets. Caseload and court resources are a related concern in many countries.
9. The interaction of the judiciary with the other state powers is fraught with problems in many judiciaries. The survey highlights some of these problems: (1) the implementation by government of judicial decisions that go against the interest of government is often inadequate,

(2) lack of respect for judicial independence by government and parliament is in many countries a big issue, according to the respondents, and (3) scarcity of resources provided by government affects independence.

Most of the judges in Europe are positive about their independence, but they identify issues that affect their independence negatively. Some of these issues are at case level, others at system level, such as appointments. The survey provides many insights into the functioning of the judiciary at national level. It is up to the Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies to analyse the outcomes for their judiciaries and address the issues that are raised by the respondents. While Councils are dependent on the other state powers for improvement of legislation and for adequate resources, judiciaries and in particular Councils can address many issues by themselves.

The ENCJ promotes Councils to initiate a process of positive change. The outcomes of the survey stress the importance of concerted effort to initiate such change. Most of the issues raised in the survey are not new, and require higher priority to resolve. In addition, the dialogue must be sought or continued with the other state powers and also with the media to promote a better understanding of the importance of judicial independence for the functioning of society and its economy. The dataset of the survey is available on request.

## Annex 1 Independence by characteristic

Country		Gender		Judicial experience							Type of court				Type of cases				Member of Judges Association	
		Female	Male	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years	Court of first instance	Appeal court	Supreme Court/ Cassation	administrative cases	(including family) criminal cases	civil criminal cases in equal measure	civil, administrative and criminal cases in equal measure	Yes	No		
Austria	8.9	8.8	8.8	8.9	8.5	8.7	8.7	9.0	8.9	8.7	9.3	8.7	8.9	9.0	-	8.9	8.3			
Belgium	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.9	8.6	8.7	-	-	8.8	8.5	-	8.9	8.7			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.9	7.1	6.7	6.9	7.3	6.8	7.2	6.8	7.0	6.9	-	-	7.1	6.6	-	6.9	7.3			
Bulgaria	7.2	7.2	7.5	7.2	7.0	7.1	7.1	7.3	7.1	7.4	7.7	7.4	7.0	7.2	-	7.1	7.2			
Croatia	7.2	7.7	7.2	7.2	6.7	7.3	7.3	7.8	7.2	7.7	-	7.2	7.3	7.6	-	7.5	7.0			
Cyprus	9.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	-			
Czech Republic	9.2	8.9	9.1	8.8	8.9	9.2	9.1	9.2	9.1	9.1	-	9.1	9.2	9.0	-	9.1	9.1			
Denmark	9.9	9.9	9.9	-	9.8	9.8	-	-	-	9.8	9.9	-	-	-	-	9.9	9.8			
Estonia	8.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.6	-	-	8.6	-	-	8.8	-			
Finland	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.3	9.4	-	-	9.3	9.2	9.5	-	9.6	9.3	9.1	-	9.4	9.2			
France	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.3	8.3	-	8.2	8.4			
Germany	9.0	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.9	9.0	8.9	8.8	8.9	9.1	8.8	8.9	8.8	-	8.9	8.9			
Greece	8.2	8.1	7.9	8.2	8.1	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.2	8.5	8.4	8.1	-	-	8.2	-			
Hungary	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.2	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.4	8.6	7.9	8.3	-	8.1	8.1			
Ireland	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.5	-	-	-	-	9.4	-	-	-	9.3	9.4	-	9.4	-			
Italy	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.0	7.7	-	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.2	-	8.0	8.2	8.2	-	8.2	7.4			
Latvia	7.2	7.0	-	-	7.3	7.1	-	7.2	6.9	7.4	-	7.8	7.0	7.2	-	7.6	6.7			
Lithuania	7.5	7.6	8.2	7.4	-	8.2	-	-	7.6	7.3	-	-	7.3	7.8	-	7.5	6.9			
Montenegro	8.0	7.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	8.0	7.6	-	7.9	7.3			
Netherlands	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.2	9.3	-	9.2	9.2	9.2	-	9.2	9.2			
Norway	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.2	9.1	9.0	9.0	9.5	9.2	9.3	-	-	-	-	-	9.3	-			
Portugal	8.3	8.4	8.5	-	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.5	8.2	8.7	-	-	8.4	8.3	-	8.3	8.2			
Slovakia	-	6.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.3	-	-	-	7.3	-	-	-	7.3			
Slovenia	7.4	8.2	-	-	7.3	7.8	7.9	7.2	7.4	8.0	-	-	7.5	8.0	-	7.5	7.7			
Spain	7.9	8.1	8.3	7.8	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.1	7.9	8.2	-	8.1	8.0	8.0	-	7.9	8.1			
Sweden	8.9	8.8	9.1	8.6	8.7	8.9	9.1	8.8	8.8	9.0	-	8.8	9.1	8.7	-	8.9	8.8			
United Kingdom: England and Wales	9.4	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	-	9.3	9.5	9.5	-	9.5	9.5			
United Kingdom: Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
United Kingdom: Scotland	9.3	9.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	9.2			
Country average	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.8	8.8	8.5			

Table 2. Personal independence by characteristic; minimum of 30 respondents per country

Country	Gender		Judicial experience							Type of court				Type of cases				Member of Judges Association	
	Female	Male	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years	Court of first instance	Appeal court	Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation	administrative cases	civil (including family) cases	criminal cases	civil and criminal cases in equal measure	civil, administrative and criminal cases in equal measure	Yes	No	
Austria	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3	8.9	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.8	9.3	9.4	9.4	-	-	9.3	8.9	
Belgium	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.4	9.2	9.4	9.2	9.3	9.2	-	-	9.4	9.1	9.4	-	9.4	9.3	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8.7	8.4	8.0	8.7	8.6	8.6	9.0	8.5	8.6	8.6	-	-	8.7	8.3	8.5	-	8.5	8.8	
Bulgaria	9.0	8.7	9.4	8.7	8.9	8.8	8.9	8.8	8.8	9.0	9.5	9.1	8.9	8.8	-	9.1	9.0	8.9	
Croatia	8.7	9.0	8.7	9.0	8.3	8.7	8.6	9.2	8.7	9.1	-	9.1	8.7	9.0	-	-	8.9	8.7	
Cyprus	9.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.8	-	-	-	-	-	9.8	-	9.7	-	
Czech Republic	9.6	9.4	9.6	9.2	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.4	9.4	-	9.5	9.6	9.4	-	-	9.6	9.5	
Denmark	9.9	9.9	9.9	-	9.9	9.8	-	-	9.8	9.9	-	-	-	-	9.9	-	9.9	-	
Estonia	9.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.0	-	-	-	8.9	-	-	-	9.3	-	
Finland	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.6	9.6	-	-	9.6	9.5	9.6	-	9.6	9.6	9.3	9.5	-	9.6	9.4	
France	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.8	9.1	9.0	9.1	9.0	9.1	9.5	9.4	9.0	9.0	9.1	8.7	8.8	9.2	
Germany	9.1	9.1	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.4	9.1	9.1	9.0	9.1	-	9.1	9.0	
Greece	9.1	9.0	8.9	9.1	9.2	8.9	9.3	9.3	9.0	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.1	-	8.8	-	9.1	-	
Hungary	9.1	9.0	9.4	9.3	9.0	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.2	9.3	9.2	8.9	9.3	-	-	9.2	9.0	
Ireland	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.7	-	-	-	-	9.6	-	-	-	9.6	9.6	-	-	9.7	-	
Italy	9.4	8.9	9.4	8.9	8.8	-	9.5	9.1	9.2	9.1	-	9.4	9.0	9.2	-	-	9.2	8.7	
Latvia	7.9	7.5	-	-	7.8	7.7	-	7.8	7.6	8.0	-	8.3	7.8	7.7	-	-	8.2	7.4	
Lithuania	8.2	7.8	9.0	8.3	-	8.1	-	-	8.1	7.9	-	7.9	8.1	-	8.1	-	8.4	7.4	
Montenegro	9.1	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.9	-	-	-	9.1	8.6	-	-	8.9	8.7	
Netherlands	9.4	9.4	9.2	9.4	9.5	9.4	9.3	9.5	9.3	9.4	-	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.1	-	9.4	9.4	
Norway	9.6	9.4	9.5	9.3	9.6	9.4	-	9.7	9.5	9.4	-	-	-	-	9.4	-	9.5	-	
Portugal	9.1	9.0	9.2	-	8.7	8.9	9.0	9.2	8.9	9.4	-	-	9.0	9.1	8.8	-	9.0	9.2	
Slovakia	-	8.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.4	-	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	8.7	
Slovenia	8.2	9.1	-	-	7.8	8.6	8.7	8.3	8.2	8.8	-	-	8.2	8.7	-	-	8.3	8.3	
Spain	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.0	9.1	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.0	9.3	-	9.1	9.1	9.2	9.1	-	9.1	9.2	
Sweden	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.2	9.2	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.3	9.4	-	9.4	9.5	9.3	9.4	-	9.3	9.4	
United Kingdom: England and Wales	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.5	9.6	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.6	-	9.4	9.6	9.5	9.7	9.8	9.6	9.6	
United Kingdom: Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
United Kingdom: Scotland	9.3	9.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.6	9.3	
<b>Country average</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>8.9</b>	

## Annex 2 Mapping “respect” for judicial independence

This appendix aims at outlining the methodology behind the “maps” presented in the *Box: Mapping „respect” for judicial independence*.

### The Data

The departure point is the description of the data. The data consists of individual-level responses to the Statement: “During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:”. Respondents were provided with a baseline list of 12 stakeholders: including state institutions (both judicial, like *Supreme Court* and *Constitutional Court*, and non-judicial like *Prosecution*, *Parliament* and *Government*), *Media* (traditional and social) and groups like *parties* and *lawyers* appearing before the courts.<sup>10</sup> To accommodate differences in the institutional design of countries covered by the Survey, the answer “does not exist” had been added (like *Council of the Judiciary* in Germany or *Constitutional Court* in the Netherlands). Given plausible differences in perception between *Supreme Court* judges and the ordinary court judges - as well as due to the low number of responses from the former – the analysis focused on the perceptions of the *First Instance* and *Appellate* judges. Responses have been transformed to the numerical scale, with agreement coded as positive values, disagreement as negative values and “not sure” – as neutral.<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, due to the data requirements of PCA (only responses covering all stakeholders could be applied), a substantial number of observations was dropped. As a result, the analysis has been performed only on countries with a sufficiently large number of workable observations (see table below). Percentages of judges viewing specific stakeholders as “respecting” or “not respecting” their independence in the whole sample and in the subsample applied in PCA turned out roughly equal. Thereby, no systemic bias was introduced by lost observations.

Country	Overall number of responses	Workable observations for PCA
Bulgaria	424	343
France	1583	909
Germany	3140	2369
Hungary	788	741
Netherlands	775	458
Spain	1191	855

Source: Own compilation

### The Method

Principal Components Analysis (PCA) synthesizes information from a large set of variables into a smaller set of so called *Principal Components*. Thus, it reduces redundant information (for example, a sequence of individual assessments of similarly perceived institutions into just one aggregate) or uncovers some unobservable (latent) factor (like personality trait, uncovered from the battery of questions in a personality test). Doing that, the PCA algorithm calculates so called *factor loadings*. These indicate how a given variable<sup>12</sup> contributes to the subsequent *Principal Components* (the larger absolute value of the loading, the higher proportion of the variable’s variance is explained by a given component). Using *factor loadings* in two selected components, one can present the variables that are analyzed in a space

<sup>10</sup> Full list – in original ordering - includes: *Association of Judges; Constitutional Court; Council for the Judiciary; Court Management incl Court President; Government; Lawyers; Media (i.e. press, television or radio); Parliament; Parties; Prosecution; Social Media (for example Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn); Supreme Court.*

<sup>11</sup> I.e. Strongly agree (+2), Agree (+1), Not sure (0), Disagree (-1), Strongly disagree (-2).

<sup>12</sup> From the original, large data set.

defined by these two components (i.e. components define vertical and horizontal axis, and variables are represented as points on the scatterplot).

As PCA is just a data dimensionality reduction technique, obtained components (and *factor loadings*) reflects nothing more than the patterns recovered from the data. In order to give sense to the *components* (provide labels to the vertical and horizontal axis) they need to be interpreted, which is sometimes difficult and introduces a degree of subjectivity.

## Results

Across the selected countries, the PCA analysis of the responses to the statement<sup>13</sup> revealed that the first *principal component* explains nearly half of the overall variance, with broadly similar loadings from all stakeholders. That in turn suggests the existence of some unobservable, individual-level characteristic linked to the way a given respondent perceives “respect” for his or her independence in general.

However, second and third components, together explaining an additional quarter of the overall variance, allowed for clear differentiation of stakeholders. Thereby, respective *factor loadings* were applied to draw the “maps” presented in the Box.

	PC 1	PC 2 (horizontal axis on the “maps”)	PC 3 (vertical axis on the “maps”)
Bulgaria	48%	16%	8%
France	48%	20%	7%
Germany	53%	12%	7%
Hungary	45%	19%	9%
Netherlands	42%	16%	10%
Spain	52%	14%	8%

*Source: Own compilation*

## Interpretation

One way to interpret PCA results is to examine the *factor loadings* of various stakeholders in subsequent *principal components*. Knowing which variable contributes the most to a given component (with either positive or negative sign) one could try to label the component in a meaningful way. Then, two components could be used as axes on the presented “maps”. For example, the horizontal axis could be interpreted as an ordering of stakeholders from political life to the legal sphere – while the vertical axis could be interpreted as representing a move from the courtroom towards the nation as a whole. Nevertheless, such storytelling remains more of an art than a science. First, it introduces substantial subjectivity. Second, as the analysis is carried out separately for each country, resulting labels could also differ from country to country.

Here, we deliberately refrained from interpreting and labelling (or even plotting) axes on the presented maps. Instead, we focused only on the location and assessment of specific stakeholders – their distance or proximity, and whether they form clusters that might be explained using country-specific knowledge.

<sup>13</sup> In other words, 12 variables, each of them representing individual responses of the judges, rating „respect” of a given stakeholder to one’s independence, with individual answers coded on +2,+1,0,-1,-2 scale. If given institution does not exist in a specific country (like a Council of the Judiciary in Germany) smaller numbers of variables were analyzed.

## Annex 3 Outcome of the survey in tables

### Overall perception of independence

1. The professional judges in my country are on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence"):

	Resposns	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Austria	740	8.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	5%	22%	42%	28%
Belgium	457	8.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	7%	23%	42%	24%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	7.0	3%	1%	1%	2%	3%	15%	5%	21%	24%	14%	10%
Bulgaria	424	7.2	0%	0%	1%	2%	4%	14%	8%	21%	25%	14%	10%
Croatia	525	7.4	1%	0%	2%	2%	2%	12%	5%	17%	26%	16%	15%
Cyprus	60	9.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	10%	25%	63%
Czech Republic	378	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	18%	35%	42%
Denmark	211	9.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	9%	89%
Estonia	67	8.8	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	4%	4%	21%	30%	37%
Finland	227	9.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	8%	37%	51%
France	1,583	8.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	14%	31%	35%	14%
Germany	3,140	8.9	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	6%	19%	41%	31%
Greece	826	8.2	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	5%	17%	30%	26%	18%
Hungary	788	8.1	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	7%	5%	12%	20%	19%	31%
Ireland	115	9.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%	0%	11%	27%	59%
Italy	423	8.2	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	5%	4%	11%	25%	30%	20%
Latvia	200	7.2	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	14%	7%	20%	28%	22%	3%
Lithuania	181	7.5	1%	1%	3%	2%	2%	10%	4%	15%	29%	22%	12%
Montenegro	100	7.8	1%	2%	0%	2%	1%	8%	9%	10%	31%	9%	27%
Netherlands	775	9.2	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	11%	48%	39%
Norway	315	9.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	11%	29%	55%
Portugal	494	8.3	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	4%	12%	28%	32%	19%
Slovakia	67	7.1	1%	1%	3%	1%	3%	13%	6%	10%	33%	21%	6%
Slovenia	193	7.5	1%	2%	1%	2%	2%	8%	6%	17%	29%	23%	11%
Spain	1,191	8.0	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	5%	5%	15%	29%	28%	14%
Sweden	599	8.8	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	5%	17%	35%	37%
England and Wales	1,273	9.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	8%	25%	64%
Northern Ireland	27	9.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	19%	78%
Scotland	104	9.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	13%	29%	57%
Total/Average	15,821	8.5	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	4%	3%	9%	20%	27%	33%

2. As a judge, I am on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence"):

	Resposns	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Austria	740	9.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	11%	27%	57%
Belgium	457	9.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	8%	30%	55%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	8.6	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	2%	9%	12%	18%	50%	5%
Bulgaria	424	8.9	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	3%	5%	11%	25%	51%
Croatia	525	8.8	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	6%	2%	4%	9%	17%	58%
Cyprus	60	9.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	3%	8%	85%
Czech Republic	378	9.5	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	6%	22%	69%
Denmark	211	9.9	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	6%	91%
Estonia	67	9.2	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	4%	0%	10%	19%	63%
Finland	227	9.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	6%	26%	66%
France	1,583	9.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	7%	16%	31%	43%
Germany	3,140	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	14%	32%	47%
Greece	826	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	6%	14%	28%	49%
Hungary	788	9.1	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	3%	2%	5%	9%	18%	61%
Ireland	115	9.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	4%	15%	79%
Italy	423	9.1	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%	9%	23%	59%
Latvia	200	7.8	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%	11%	7%	16%	19%	28%	18%
Lithuania	181	8.0	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	7%	3%	7%	23%	23%	29%
Montenegro	100	8.8	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	6%	2%	3%	8%	17%	59%
Netherlands	775	9.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	9%	36%	52%
Norway	315	9.5	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	6%	24%	67%
Portugal	494	9.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	6%	14%	24%	51%
Slovakia	67	8.3	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	12%	0%	3%	10%	31%	37%
Slovenia	193	8.3	0%	1%	2%	2%	1%	5%	4%	9%	16%	27%	33%
Spain	1,191	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	3%	4%	10%	24%	55%
Sweden	599	9.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	10%	26%	60%
England and Wales	1,273	9.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	6%	18%	73%
Northern Ireland	27	9.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	4%	0%	11%	81%
Scotland	104	9.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	11%	21%	65%
Average	15,821	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	2%	4%	10%	23%	57%

3. Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much.

Total	Respos	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	740	1%	12%	75%	6%	6%
Belgium	457	2%	16%	75%	3%	4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	2%	7%	67%	10%	15%
Bulgaria	424	3%	8%	60%	12%	18%
Croatia	525	3%	7%	71%	8%	11%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	80%	3%	17%
Czech Republic	378	0%	4%	69%	11%	16%
Denmark	211	0%	8%	89%	1%	1%
Estonia	67	7%	15%	64%	6%	7%
Finland	227	0%	7%	71%	14%	7%
France	1,583	4%	21%	67%	7%	2%
Germany	3,140	2%	9%	72%	11%	7%
Greece	826	2%	7%	76%	6%	10%
Hungary	788	10%	16%	58%	6%	10%
Ireland	115	2%	7%	83%	4%	4%
Italy	423	3%	16%	70%	3%	8%
Latvia	200	4%	13%	46%	25%	13%
Lithuania	181	9%	20%	54%	10%	7%
Montenegro	100	4%	5%	74%	7%	10%
Netherlands	775	1%	13%	78%	6%	2%
Norway	315	1%	10%	84%	5%	0%
Portugal	494	7%	28%	53%	7%	4%
Slovakia	67	13%	22%	48%	7%	9%
Slovenia	193	6%	22%	65%	6%	2%
Spain	1,191	11%	23%	60%	4%	2%
Sweden	599	3%	15%	68%	10%	5%
England and Wales	1,273	1%	7%	83%	5%	4%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	7%	89%	0%	4%
Scotland	104	3%	13%	80%	1%	3%
Average	15,821	4%	12%	70%	7%	7%

0 - 5 years	Respos	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	78	0%	3%	77%	8%	13%
Belgium	120	0%	3%	87%	5%	5%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	1%	11%	1%	1%
Bulgaria	40	0%	5%	68%	3%	25%
Croatia	38	0%	5%	61%	13%	21%
Cyprus	22	0%	0%	73%	9%	18%
Czech Republic	70	0%	6%	81%	1%	11%
Denmark	50	0%	2%	92%	4%	2%
Estonia	7	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Finland	76	0%	3%	74%	13%	11%
France	358	1%	11%	83%	4%	1%
Germany	542	0%	4%	71%	13%	12%
Greece	147	0%	7%	78%	5%	10%
Hungary	91	0%	9%	74%	5%	12%
Ireland	45	0%	7%	80%	7%	7%
Italy	92	0%	10%	75%	0%	15%
Latvia	22	0%	9%	59%	27%	5%
Lithuania	32	0%	9%	81%	6%	3%
Montenegro	17	6%	6%	71%	6%	12%
Netherlands	143	0%	2%	84%	10%	3%
Norway	94	0%	4%	91%	3%	1%
Portugal	46	0%	13%	65%	13%	9%
Slovakia	26	12%	23%	50%	8%	8%
Slovenia	21	0%	10%	76%	10%	5%
Spain	95	1%	11%	81%	2%	5%
Sweden	136	1%	7%	75%	11%	7%
England and Wales	358	0%	1%	80%	10%	8%
Northern Ireland	6	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Scotland	23	0%	9%	87%	0%	4%
Average	3,133	1%	6%	75%	7%	8%

6 - 10 years	Respos	Deteriorate d much	Deteriorate d a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	137	1%	12%	73%	9%	6%
Belgium	86	1%	9%	85%	0%	5%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	1%	9%	1%	4%
Bulgaria	37	3%	8%	73%	11%	5%
Croatia	49	2%	10%	78%	4%	6%
Cyprus	11	0%	0%	91%	0%	9%
Czech Republic	42	2%	7%	76%	14%	0%
Denmark	29	0%	3%	97%	0%	0%
Estonia	16	6%	25%	63%	0%	6%
Finland	52	2%	2%	75%	13%	8%
France	204	5%	21%	67%	6%	1%
Germany	347	1%	8%	67%	16%	8%
Greece	232	1%	5%	79%	6%	9%
Hungary	98	4%	14%	66%	8%	7%
Ireland	41	2%	2%	88%	5%	2%
Italy	42	0%	26%	67%	2%	5%
Latvia	27	0%	19%	70%	7%	4%
Lithuania	37	3%	14%	73%	8%	3%
Montenegro	22	5%	5%	82%	5%	5%
Netherlands	97	0%	8%	86%	5%	1%
Norway	63	3%	10%	84%	3%	0%
Portugal	27	4%	30%	63%	4%	0%
Slovakia	8	38%	25%	25%	0%	13%
Slovenia	11	0%	36%	55%	0%	9%
Spain	113	10%	27%	58%	4%	3%
Sweden	113	2%	11%	77%	9%	2%
England and Wales	233	1%	5%	87%	3%	3%
Northern Ireland	8	0%	13%	75%	0%	13%
Scotland	25	0%	16%	84%	0%	0%
Average	2,545	3%	13%	71%	5%	5%

11 - 15 years	Respos	Deteriorate d much	Deteriorate d a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	84	1%	19%	67%	8%	5%
Belgium	73	4%	22%	71%	3%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	1%	16%	2%	2%
Bulgaria	64	2%	6%	75%	6%	11%
Croatia	75	8%	12%	65%	7%	8%
Cyprus	9	0%	0%	78%	0%	22%
Czech Republic	36	0%	8%	72%	11%	8%
Denmark	57	0%	11%	88%	0%	2%
Estonia	8	13%	0%	88%	0%	0%
Finland	35	0%	14%	66%	17%	3%
France	188	5%	29%	59%	7%	1%
Germany	463	2%	10%	72%	11%	6%
Greece	113	3%	8%	73%	7%	9%
Hungary	127	15%	17%	54%	6%	8%
Ireland	17	0%	12%	88%	0%	0%
Italy	33	3%	12%	67%	6%	12%
Latvia	36	6%	11%	36%	31%	17%
Lithuania	26	23%	23%	38%	12%	4%
Montenegro	19	0%	5%	89%	5%	0%
Netherlands	148	0%	14%	78%	7%	1%
Norway	60	2%	15%	82%	2%	0%
Portugal	72	7%	36%	49%	4%	4%
Slovakia	5	20%	0%	80%	0%	0%
Slovenia	36	8%	28%	56%	8%	0%
Spain	163	10%	26%	58%	4%	1%
Sweden	161	2%	25%	60%	7%	5%
England and Wales	275	1%	9%	86%	3%	1%
Northern Ireland	3	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Scotland	21	5%	19%	67%	5%	5%
Average	2,745	5%	14%	68%	6%	5%

16 - 20 years	Respos	Deteriorate d much	Deteriorate d a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	108	0%	17%	69%	6%	8%
Belgium	57	2%	35%	58%	4%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	1%	7%	1%	2%
Bulgaria	59	3%	8%	59%	15%	14%
Croatia	66	5%	5%	76%	6%	9%
Cyprus	8	0%	0%	88%	0%	13%
Czech Republic	71	0%	3%	70%	14%	13%
Denmark	33	0%	12%	88%	0%	0%
Estonia	16	6%	19%	50%	13%	13%
Finland	17	0%	6%	76%	12%	6%
France	230	7%	28%	59%	7%	0%
Germany	406	1%	10%	71%	10%	7%
Greece	113	4%	10%	69%	7%	10%
Hungary	128	10%	23%	47%	5%	15%
Ireland	6	17%	17%	67%	0%	0%
Italy	26	0%	35%	54%	4%	8%
Latvia	44	9%	18%	43%	20%	9%
Lithuania	30	7%	23%	37%	17%	17%
Montenegro	16	6%	6%	50%	25%	13%
Netherlands	130	2%	18%	74%	3%	3%
Norway	41	2%	15%	76%	7%	0%
Portugal	83	11%	30%	52%	2%	5%
Slovakia	11	9%	36%	45%	9%	0%
Slovenia	37	5%	22%	70%	3%	0%
Spain	159	9%	31%	58%	1%	1%
Sweden	90	3%	13%	70%	7%	7%
England and Wales	188	0%	14%	78%	5%	3%
Northern Ireland	3	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Scotland	18	11%	6%	78%	0%	6%
Average	2,532	5%	16%	63%	7%	6%

21 - 25 years	Respos	Deteriorate d much	Deteriorate d a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	110	0%	10%	83%	5%	3%
Belgium	67	0%	24%	69%	6%	1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	1%	9%	1%	2%
Bulgaria	118	5%	8%	55%	13%	19%
Croatia	119	3%	8%	71%	6%	12%
Cyprus	8	0%	0%	88%	0%	13%
Czech Republic	62	0%	3%	69%	11%	16%
Denmark	25	0%	12%	88%	0%	0%
Estonia	7	14%	43%	43%	0%	0%
Finland	16	0%	13%	63%	13%	13%
France	175	2%	25%	65%	7%	1%
Germany	433	2%	10%	73%	9%	6%
Greece	119	3%	10%	77%	4%	6%
Hungary	138	12%	17%	52%	6%	12%
Ireland	3	0%	0%	67%	0%	33%
Italy	40	5%	10%	80%	3%	3%
Latvia	25	4%	16%	36%	16%	28%
Lithuania	28	18%	18%	50%	11%	4%
Montenegro	7	14%	0%	71%	0%	14%
Netherlands	118	2%	21%	69%	6%	2%
Norway	27	0%	11%	85%	4%	0%
Portugal	101	12%	36%	45%	7%	1%
Slovakia	8	13%	25%	50%	13%	0%
Slovenia	33	3%	24%	64%	6%	3%
Spain	202	14%	25%	58%	2%	0%
Sweden	39	3%	13%	69%	13%	3%
England and Wales	131	2%	11%	84%	2%	2%
Northern Ireland	3	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Scotland	9	0%	33%	67%	0%	0%
Average	2,509	4%	15%	66%	6%	7%

Over 25 years	Respos	Deteriorate d much	Deteriorate d a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	223	1%	13%	77%	5%	4%
Belgium	54	6%	17%	69%	2%	7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	1%	1%	15%	3%	4%
Bulgaria	106	1%	9%	50%	15%	25%
Croatia	178	1%	6%	72%	10%	12%
Cyprus	2	0%	0%	50%	0%	50%
Czech Republic	97	0%	3%	53%	12%	32%
Denmark	17	0%	12%	76%	6%	6%
Estonia	13	8%	0%	62%	15%	15%
Finland	31	0%	13%	68%	16%	3%
France	428	4%	19%	62%	10%	5%
Germany	949	3%	10%	74%	8%	5%
Greece	102	1%	3%	73%	8%	16%
Hungary	206	13%	14%	61%	4%	7%
Ireland	3	0%	33%	67%	0%	0%
Italy	190	6%	17%	68%	4%	6%
Latvia	46	2%	4%	41%	37%	15%
Lithuania	28	7%	36%	36%	7%	14%
Montenegro	19	0%	5%	74%	0%	21%
Netherlands	139	2%	16%	76%	6%	1%
Norway	30	0%	7%	77%	17%	0%
Portugal	165	5%	22%	57%	10%	5%
Slovakia	9	0%	11%	44%	11%	33%
Slovenia	55	9%	18%	65%	5%	2%
Spain	459	12%	21%	59%	5%	3%
Sweden	60	7%	20%	50%	18%	5%
England and Wales	88	2%	14%	82%	1%	1%
Northern Ireland	4	0%	25%	75%	0%	0%
Scotland	8	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Average	4,047	3%	13%	63%	8%	10%

4. Only answer if there exists a Council for the judiciary in your country: On a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "the highest possible degree of independence"). The Council for the judiciary in my country is:

	Respos	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Austria *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belgium	449	6.6	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%	16%	12%	18%	19%	15%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	273	5.7	7%	4%	7%	4%	7%	21%	6%	14%	10%	8%
Bulgaria	410	3.8	15%	14%	10%	11%	8%	17%	5%	5%	5%	3%
Croatia	514	6.2	8%	4%	5%	5%	3%	13%	8%	13%	13%	10%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	203	7.3	2%	0%	2%	3%	2%	16%	7%	12%	20%	10%
Estonia *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	224	8.3	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	7%	3%	8%	26%	29%
France	1,571	7.8	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	8%	7%	15%	22%	24%
Germany *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	824	7.9	1%	0%	1%	1%	2%	8%	7%	15%	21%	22%
Hungary	786	7.1	7%	5%	3%	2%	2%	7%	5%	7%	13%	15%
Ireland	110	9.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	3%	1%	11%	10%	15%
Italy	420	5.9	5%	2%	4%	4%	6%	18%	19%	16%	14%	7%
Latvia	200	7.0	1%	1%	3%	5%	2%	11%	9%	20%	28%	15%
Lithuania	180	7.0	3%	4%	3%	1%	3%	9%	9%	12%	23%	17%
Montenegro	99	6.6	4%	2%	3%	6%	6%	16%	7%	10%	17%	7%
Netherlands	771	7.2	0%	1%	2%	2%	3%	9%	12%	24%	26%	14%
Norway	310	7.4	1%	1%	3%	1%	3%	12%	5%	14%	23%	16%
Portugal	488	6.5	2%	3%	2%	3%	6%	15%	14%	17%	19%	10%
Slovakia	66	3.6	21%	11%	8%	12%	6%	14%	11%	9%	8%	0%
Slovenia	190	6.2	1%	5%	5%	5%	6%	18%	11%	8%	22%	13%
Spain	1,181	2.7	28%	15%	12%	9%	9%	14%	5%	3%	2%	1%
Sweden *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
England and Wales	471	9.2	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%	2%	3%	9%	16%
Northern Ireland	25	9.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	12%
Scotland	41	9.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	7%	17%
Total/Average	9,806	6.9	5%	3%	3%	4%	4%	11%	7%	12%	16%	13%

\*) country has no Council for the Judiciary

5. Only answer if there exists a Council for the Judiciary in your country: I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively

	Respos	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria *	-	-	-	-
Belgium	453	42%	39%	20%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	295	40%	40%	20%
Bulgaria	419	32%	35%	34%
Croatia	519	49%	31%	20%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic *	-	-	-	-
Denmark	210	50%	35%	15%
Estonia *	-	-	-	-
Finland	224	59%	25%	16%
France	1,576	44%	24%	32%
Germany *	-	-	-	-
Greece	825	57%	33%	10%
Hungary	788	35%	27%	39%
Ireland	110	61%	31%	8%
Italy	423	46%	15%	39%
Latvia	200	32%	43%	26%
Lithuania	180	35%	34%	31%
Montenegro	99	60%	25%	15%
Netherlands	772	44%	41%	15%
Norway	314	75%	18%	7%
Portugal	493	46%	19%	35%
Slovakia	67	21%	40%	39%
Slovenia	193	32%	46%	23%
Spain	1,189	19%	18%	63%
Sweden *	-	-	-	-
England and Wales	569	56%	36%	9%
Northern Ireland	25	68%	24%	8%
Scotland	44	50%	34%	16%
Total/Average	9,987	46%	31%	23%

\*) country has no Council for the Judiciary

#### Aspects of independence: implementation of judgments

6. In the last three years, I believe judgements that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country

	Respos	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	75%	17%	8%
Belgium	457	55%	27%	18%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	28%	47%	25%
Bulgaria	424	25%	58%	16%
Croatia	525	47%	35%	18%
Cyprus	60	25%	28%	47%
Czech Republic	378	58%	31%	11%
Denmark	211	57%	26%	17%
Estonia	67	72%	15%	13%
Finland	227	72%	17%	11%
France	1,583	51%	32%	18%
Germany	3,140	78%	12%	10%
Greece	826	31%	37%	32%
Hungary	788	46%	32%	22%
Ireland	115	83%	5%	11%
Italy	423	21%	35%	44%
Latvia	200	27%	57%	17%
Lithuania	181	18%	48%	34%
Montenegro	100	34%	42%	24%
Netherlands	775	79%	14%	7%
Norway	315	82%	8%	10%
Portugal	494	40%	39%	21%
Slovakia	67	30%	57%	13%
Slovenia	193	19%	54%	26%
Spain	1,191	35%	26%	39%
Sweden	599	76%	13%	12%
England and Wales	1,273	70%	15%	15%
Northern Ireland	27	63%	15%	22%
Scotland	104	73%	16%	11%
Total/Average	15,821	51%	30%	20%

**Aspects of independence: influence of the European Union**

7. I believe that the independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA

7	Respos	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	63%	27%	11%
Belgium	457	61%	31%	8%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	324	50%	36%	14%
Bulgaria	422	51%	31%	18%
Croatia	524	63%	24%	13%
Cyprus	60	73%	15%	12%
Czech Republic	378	68%	24%	8%
Denmark	211	35%	46%	18%
Estonia	67	75%	22%	3%
Finland	226	46%	40%	14%
France	1,580	66%	22%	13%
Germany	3,138	52%	31%	18%
Greece	825	68%	24%	8%
Hungary	787	56%	30%	14%
Ireland	115	83%	10%	7%
Italy	422	60%	20%	19%
Latvia	200	71%	24%	6%
Lithuania	181	74%	18%	8%
Montenegro	100	69%	20%	11%
Netherlands	774	66%	24%	10%
Norway	314	35%	41%	24%
Portugal	494	80%	16%	5%
Slovakia	67	64%	21%	15%
Slovenia	193	53%	34%	13%
Spain	1,191	75%	16%	9%
Sweden	599	42%	46%	12%
England and Wales	-	-	-	-
Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-
Scotland	-	-	-	-
Total/Average	14,389	61%	27%	12%

**Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure**

8a. During the last three years I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way

8a	Respos	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	2%	2%	96%
Belgium	457	5%	4%	91%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	7%	3%	90%
Bulgaria	424	5%	4%	92%
Croatia	525	8%	2%	90%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	378	2%	1%	97%
Denmark	211	0%	1%	99%
Estonia	67	6%	0%	94%
Finland	227	7%	1%	92%
France	1,583	8%	3%	89%
Germany	3,140	3%	2%	95%
Greece	826	6%	2%	92%
Hungary	788	4%	3%	93%
Ireland	115	4%	0%	96%
Italy	423	6%	1%	92%
Latvia	200	16%	16%	68%
Lithuania	181	8%	10%	82%
Montenegro	100	6%	4%	90%
Netherlands	775	1%	1%	98%
Norway	315	3%	1%	97%
Portugal	494	6%	2%	92%
Slovakia	67	16%	4%	79%
Slovenia	193	8%	4%	88%
Spain	1,191	8%	3%	89%
Sweden	599	5%	2%	93%
England and Wales	1,273	3%	1%	96%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	0%	96%
Scotland	104	1%	2%	97%
Total/Average	15,821	5%	3%	92%

8b. During the last three years I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly.

8b	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure	Disagree
Austria	740	0%	1%	1%	2%	96%
Belgium	457	0%	1%	3%	4%	91%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	5%	2%	3%	90%
Bulgaria	424	0%	2%	3%	4%	92%
Croatia	525	2%	3%	3%	2%	90%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	378	0%	0%	2%	1%	97%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Estonia	67	1%	3%	1%	0%	94%
Finland	227	0%	0%	7%	1%	92%
France	1,583	0%	3%	5%	3%	89%
Germany	3,140	1%	1%	1%	2%	95%
Greece	826	0%	2%	3%	2%	92%
Hungary	788	0%	2%	2%	3%	93%
Ireland	115	1%	2%	2%	0%	96%
Italy	423	0%	3%	3%	1%	92%
Latvia	200	2%	9%	5%	16%	68%
Lithuania	181	1%	2%	5%	10%	82%
Montenegro	100	0%	3%	3%	4%	90%
Netherlands	775	0%	0%	1%	1%	98%
Norway	315	0%	1%	1%	1%	97%
Portugal	494	0%	2%	4%	2%	92%
Slovakia	67	3%	6%	7%	4%	79%
Slovenia	193	0%	3%	5%	4%	88%
Spain	1,191	1%	4%	3%	3%	89%
Sweden	599	0%	2%	3%	2%	93%
England and Wales	1,274	0%	1%	2%	1%	96%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	0%	4%	0%	96%
Scotland	104	0%	1%	0%	2%	97%
Total/Average	15,822	1%	2%	3%	3%	92%

9a. I believe that in my country during the last three years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way

9a	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	3%	14%	83%
Belgium	457	2%	11%	87%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	22%	51%	28%
Bulgaria	424	21%	48%	31%
Croatia	525	30%	47%	23%
Cyprus	60	0%	2%	98%
Czech Republic	378	16%	35%	49%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	6%	15%	79%
Finland	227	0%	4%	96%
France	1,583	5%	7%	89%
Germany	3,140	3%	9%	88%
Greece	826	14%	39%	46%
Hungary	788	15%	24%	61%
Ireland	115	0%	3%	97%
Italy	423	36%	32%	31%
Latvia	200	6%	42%	53%
Lithuania	181	26%	48%	27%
Montenegro	100	9%	24%	67%
Netherlands	775	0%	2%	98%
Norway	315	0.6%	3%	96%
Portugal	494	26%	15%	59%
Slovakia	67	16%	49%	34%
Slovenia	193	8%	28%	64%
Spain	1,191	11%	17%	72%
Sweden	599	0.7%	4%	95%
England and Wales	1,273	0%	1%	98%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	0%	100%
Scotland	104	0%	1%	99%
Total/Average	15,821	10%	20%	71%

9b. I believe that in my country during the last three years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly

9b	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure	Disagree
Austria	740	0%	1%	2%	14%	83%
Belgium	457	0%	1%	1%	11%	87%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	4%	12%	6%	51%	28%
Bulgaria	425	3%	13%	5%	48%	31%
Croatia	526	2%	12%	16%	47%	23%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	0%	2%	98%
Czech Republic	378	0%	2%	14%	35%	49%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	0%	3%	3%	15%	79%
Finland	227	0%	0%	0%	4%	96%
France	1,583	0%	1%	3%	7%	89%
Germany	3,141	0%	1%	2%	9%	88%
Greece	826	1%	8%	5%	39%	46%
Hungary	789	1%	7%	6%	24%	61%
Ireland	115	0%	0%	0%	3%	97%
Italy	423	1%	14%	21%	32%	31%
Latvia	200	1%	3%	2%	42%	53%
Lithuania	181	1%	12%	13%	48%	27%
Montenegro	100	0%	8%	1%	24%	67%
Netherlands	775	0%	0%	0%	2%	98%
Norway	315	0%	1%	0%	3%	96%
Portugal	495	1%	6%	19%	15%	59%
Slovakia	68	1%	10%	6%	49%	34%
Slovenia	193	1%	4%	3%	28%	64%
Spain	1,192	2%	7%	2%	17%	72%
Sweden	599	0%	0%	0%	4%	95%
England and Wales	1,274	0%	0%	0%	1%	98%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Scotland	104	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Total/Average	15,829	1%	4%	5%	20%	71%

10. I believe during the last three years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.

10	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	3%	8%	89%
Belgium	457	4%	11%	85%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	12%	28%	60%
Bulgaria	424	9%	26%	65%
Croatia	525	10%	21%	69%
Cyprus	60	0%	2%	98%
Czech Republic	378	2%	9%	89%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	7%	10%	82%
Finland	227	4%	4%	93%
France	1,583	11%	13%	76%
Germany	3,140	2%	5%	93%
Greece	826	12%	26%	62%
Hungary	788	19%	16%	65%
Ireland	115	2%	2%	97%
Italy	423	8%	15%	77%
Latvia	200	8%	28%	65%
Lithuania	181	8%	28%	64%
Montenegro	100	3%	14%	83%
Netherlands	775	2%	6%	93%
Norway	315	3%	4%	93%
Portugal	494	27%	21%	52%
Slovakia	67	1%	18%	81%
Slovenia	193	7%	16%	78%
Spain	1,191	26%	25%	49%
Sweden	599	4%	5%	91%
England and Wales	1,273	1%	4%	94%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	4%	96%
Scotland	104	2%	4%	94%
Total/Average	15,821	7%	13%	80%

11. During the last three years my decisions or actions have been directly affected by a claim, or a threat of a claim, for personal liability

11	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree
Austria	740	6%	4%	91%
Belgium	457	1%	1%	98%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	9%	5%	86%
Bulgaria	424	4%	7%	89%
Croatia	525	9%	5%	86%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	378	3%	2%	96%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	3%	3%	94%
Finland	227	4%	0%	96%
France	1,583	4%	2%	94%
Germany	3,140	2%	2%	96%
Greece	826	1%	1%	98%
Hungary	788	13%	3%	84%
Ireland	115	2%	0%	98%
Italy	423	9%	7%	84%
Latvia	200	10%	9%	82%
Lithuania	181	1%	4%	96%
Montenegro	100	5%	2%	93%
Netherlands	775	0%	0%	100%
Norway	315	1%	1%	98%
Portugal	494	1%	3%	96%
Slovakia	67	15%	3%	82%
Slovenia	193	4%	2%	94%
Spain	1,191	9%	6%	85%
Sweden	599	1%	2%	97%
England and Wales	1,273	0%	0%	99%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	0%	100%
Scotland	104	1%	1%	98%
Total/Average	15,821	4%	3%	93%

12. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio)

12	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	17%	25%	58%
Belgium	457	12%	27%	61%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	30%	40%	30%
Bulgaria	424	36%	34%	30%
Croatia	525	53%	25%	22%
Cyprus	60	0%	23%	77%
Czech Republic	378	9%	19%	72%
Denmark	211	3%	6%	91%
Estonia	67	15%	19%	66%
Finland	227	8%	10%	82%
France	1,583	23%	22%	54%
Germany	3,140	13%	28%	59%
Greece	826	24%	32%	44%
Hungary	788	27%	30%	43%
Ireland	115	8%	8%	84%
Italy	423	31%	24%	45%
Latvia	200	35%	37%	29%
Lithuania	181	35%	40%	24%
Montenegro	100	17%	39%	44%
Netherlands	775	3%	15%	83%
Norway	315	4%	10%	86%
Portugal	494	40%	24%	35%
Slovakia	67	60%	24%	16%
Slovenia	193	16%	40%	44%
Spain	1,191	19%	23%	58%
Sweden	599	5%	17%	78%
England and Wales	1,273	4%	11%	85%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	7%	89%
Scotland	104	3%	9%	88%
Total/Average	15,821	19%	23%	58%

13. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, social media postings (for example, Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn)

13	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	11%	26%	63%
Belgium	457	8%	28%	63%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	20%	46%	34%
Bulgaria	424	21%	42%	37%
Croatia	525	37%	31%	32%
Cyprus	60	0%	20%	80%
Czech Republic	378	2%	17%	81%
Denmark	211	1%	5%	93%
Estonia	67	6%	25%	69%
Finland	227	4%	17%	80%
France	1,583	13%	22%	65%
Germany	3,140	7%	26%	67%
Greece	826	15%	33%	53%
Hungary	788	17%	28%	55%
Ireland	115	4%	11%	84%
Italy	423	15%	28%	57%
Latvia	200	17%	37%	46%
Lithuania	181	10%	47%	43%
Montenegro	100	11%	36%	53%
Netherlands	775	2%	16%	82%
Norway	315	3%	10%	88%
Portugal	494	22%	29%	49%
Slovakia	67	51%	21%	28%
Slovenia	193	6%	35%	59%
Spain	1,191	13%	24%	63%
Sweden	599	3%	19%	78%
England and Wales	1,273	2%	8%	90%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	7%	89%
Scotland	104	1%	9%	90%
Total/Average	15,821	11%	24%	65%

**Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure**

14. During the last three years I have been affected by a threat of, or actual, disciplinary or other official action because of how I have decided a case

14	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree
Austria	740	2%	2%	96%
Belgium	457	2%	2%	96%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	7%	4%	89%
Bulgaria	424	6%	4%	89%
Croatia	525	4%	3%	93%
Cyprus	60	0%	2%	98%
Czech Republic	378	1%	0%	99%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	7%	1%	91%
Finland	227	2%	0%	97%
France	1,583	4%	2%	94%
Germany	3,140	1%	1%	98%
Greece	826	6%	3%	91%
Hungary	788	2%	1%	97%
Ireland	115	4%	1%	95%
Italy	423	6%	2%	92%
Latvia	200	17%	12%	72%
Lithuania	181	9%	6%	85%
Montenegro	100	6%	1%	93%
Netherlands	775	0%	0%	100%
Norway	315	2%	1%	97%
Portugal	494	6%	2%	92%
Slovakia	67	15%	6%	79%
Slovenia	193	4%	1%	95%
Spain	1,191	6%	3%	90%
Sweden	599	2%	2%	96%
England and Wales	1,273	1%	1%	98%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	4%	96%
Scotland	104	4%	1%	95%
Total/Average	15,821	4%	2%	93%

15. During the last three years the management of my court has exerted pressure on me to decide individual cases in a particular way.

15	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	1%	1%	98%
Belgium	457	4%	3%	93%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	6%	4%	90%
Bulgaria	424	4%	3%	93%
Croatia	525	5%	3%	92%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	378	1%	1%	98%
Denmark	211	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	67	1%	1%	97%
Finland	227	2%	1%	97%
France	1,583	4%	3%	93%
Germany	3,140	2%	1%	97%
Greece	826	4%	3%	93%
Hungary	788	3%	4%	93%
Ireland	115	3%	0%	97%
Italy	423	4%	3%	93%
Latvia	200	7%	9%	85%
Lithuania	181	4%	3%	92%
Montenegro	100	6%	7%	87%
Netherlands	775	2%	1%	98%
Norway	315	2%	2%	96%
Portugal	494	3%	2%	95%
Slovakia	67	1%	1%	97%
Slovenia	193	2%	2%	96%
Spain	1,191	3%	3%	94%
Sweden	599	2%	2%	96%
England and Wales	1,273	3%	2%	95%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	0%	100%
Scotland	104	4%	2%	94%
Total/Average	15,821	3%	2%	95%

16. During the last two years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to decide individual cases within a particular time

16	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	16%	8%	76%
Belgium	457	5%	3%	92%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	9%	8%	83%
Bulgaria	424	4%	3%	93%
Croatia	525	18%	8%	74%
Cyprus	60	5%	3%	92%
Czech Republic	378	6%	3%	91%
Denmark	211	2%	2%	95%
Estonia	67	15%	3%	82%
Finland	227	7%	5%	88%
France	1,583	12%	4%	84%
Germany	3,140	7%	7%	86%
Greece	826	8%	5%	87%
Hungary	788	13%	5%	82%
Ireland	115	8%	3%	89%
Italy	423	13%	3%	83%
Latvia	200	19%	16%	66%
Lithuania	181	14%	4%	81%
Montenegro	100	8%	3%	89%
Netherlands	775	4%	3%	93%
Norway	315	8%	5%	87%
Portugal	494	15%	10%	75%
Slovakia	67	13%	12%	75%
Slovenia	193	15%	11%	75%
Spain	1,191	9%	4%	88%
Sweden	599	9%	4%	87%
England and Wales	1,273	12%	5%	83%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	0%	93%
Scotland	104	7%	4%	89%
Total/Average	15,821	10%	5%	85%

17. During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to reach production targets (number of adjudicated cases)

17	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	21%	10%	69%
Belgium	457	16%	9%	76%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	18%	9%	72%
Bulgaria	424	6%	6%	88%
Croatia	525	25%	7%	68%
Cyprus	60	12%	12%	77%
Czech Republic	378	12%	7%	81%
Denmark	211	6%	6%	88%
Estonia	67	21%	7%	72%
Finland	227	10%	5%	85%
France	1,583	34%	10%	56%
Germany	3,140	10%	9%	80%
Greece	826	17%	10%	74%
Hungary	788	24%	9%	67%
Ireland	115	5%	3%	92%
Italy	423	25%	4%	71%
Latvia	200	18%	16%	67%
Lithuania	181	24%	10%	66%
Montenegro	100	15%	6%	79%
Netherlands	775	7%	8%	85%
Norway	315	8%	10%	82%
Portugal	494	27%	15%	59%
Slovakia	67	24%	7%	69%
Slovenia	193	20%	13%	66%
Spain	1,191	35%	9%	56%
Sweden	599	10%	6%	85%
England and Wales	1,273	11%	8%	82%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	7%	85%
Scotland	104	6%	2%	92%
Total/Average	15,821	16%	8%	75%

18. During the last two years I have had to take decisions in accordance with guidelines developed by judges contrary to my professional opinion

18	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	6%	4%	91%
Belgium	457	7%	4%	89%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	13%	9%	78%
Bulgaria	424	22%	16%	62%
Croatia	525	21%	12%	67%
Cyprus	60	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	378	9%	6%	85%
Denmark	211	1%	0%	99%
Estonia	67	9%	1%	90%
Finland	227	4%	1%	95%
France	1,583	10%	6%	84%
Germany	3,140	4%	4%	92%
Greece	826	6%	4%	91%
Hungary	788	11%	8%	81%
Ireland	115	10%	10%	80%
Italy	423	11%	9%	80%
Latvia	200	21%	19%	61%
Lithuania	181	14%	14%	72%
Montenegro	100	25%	12%	63%
Netherlands	775	6%	5%	89%
Norway	315	2%	3%	95%
Portugal	494	5%	5%	90%
Slovakia	67	19%	9%	72%
Slovenia	193	6%	12%	82%
Spain	1,191	10%	5%	85%
Sweden	599	6%	3%	91%
England and Wales	1,273	11%	4%	85%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	0%	96%
Scotland	104	10%	5%	86%
Total/Average	15,821	10%	7%	84%

### Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

19. I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years

19	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	14%	24%	63%
Belgium	457	12%	20%	68%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	35%	41%	25%
Bulgaria	424	32%	37%	31%
Croatia	525	39%	32%	29%
Cyprus	60	2%	20%	78%
Czech Republic	378	10%	28%	63%
Denmark	211	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	67	19%	13%	67%
Finland	227	13%	6%	81%
France	1,583	5%	7%	88%
Germany	3,140	8%	13%	79%
Greece	826	13%	20%	67%
Hungary	788	42%	18%	40%
Ireland	115	22%	17%	61%
Italy	423	9%	12%	79%
Latvia	200	24%	20%	57%
Lithuania	181	28%	45%	27%
Montenegro	100	20%	24%	56%
Netherlands	775	3%	5%	92%
Norway	315	9%	9%	82%
Portugal	494	14%	20%	66%
Slovakia	67	13%	30%	57%
Slovenia	193	28%	32%	40%
Spain	1,191	15%	16%	69%
Sweden	599	14%	15%	71%
England and Wales	1,273	9%	10%	81%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	7%	93%
Scotland	104	9%	13%	79%
Total/Average	15,821	16%	19%	65%

20. I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

20	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	33%	34%	33%
Belgium	457	4%	21%	75%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	30%	47%	22%
Bulgaria	424	34%	36%	30%
Croatia	525	27%	37%	35%
Cyprus	60	7%	10%	83%
Czech Republic	378	10%	37%	53%
Denmark	211	1%	2%	97%
Estonia	67	27%	21%	52%
Finland	227	11%	13%	76%
France	1,583	9%	17%	74%
Germany	3,140	34%	32%	34%
Greece	826	20%	30%	50%
Hungary	788	52%	17%	31%
Ireland	115	22%	17%	62%
Italy	423	36%	30%	33%
Latvia	200	22%	34%	45%
Lithuania	181	22%	41%	37%
Montenegro	100	10%	27%	63%
Netherlands	775	1%	4%	96%
Norway	315	3%	7%	90%
Portugal	494	38%	25%	37%
Slovakia	67	24%	46%	30%
Slovenia	193	30%	38%	33%
Spain	1,191	65%	20%	16%
Sweden	599	5%	18%	77%
England and Wales	1,273	2%	12%	86%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	0%	96%
Scotland	104	5%	16%	79%
Total/Average	15,821	20%	24%	56%

21. I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years (Note experience may include seniority)

21	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	20%	26%	54%
Belgium	457	12%	25%	63%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	36%	41%	22%
Bulgaria	424	32%	37%	31%
Croatia	525	39%	31%	30%
Cyprus	60	3%	25%	72%
Czech Republic	378	12%	29%	59%
Denmark	211	1%	2%	97%
Estonia	67	28%	13%	58%
Finland	227	11%	11%	78%
France	1,583	25%	20%	55%
Germany	3,140	24%	23%	54%
Greece	826	19%	27%	54%
Hungary	788	44%	17%	38%
Ireland	115	19%	14%	67%
Italy	423	41%	18%	41%
Latvia	200	23%	33%	45%
Lithuania	181	30%	42%	28%
Montenegro	100	18%	20%	62%
Netherlands	775	5%	11%	85%
Norway	315	9%	10%	82%
Portugal	494	37%	21%	42%
Slovakia	67	9%	45%	46%
Slovenia	193	32%	31%	37%
Spain	1,191	36%	16%	48%
Sweden	599	14%	17%	69%
England and Wales	1,273	7%	13%	80%
Northern Ireland	27	4%	4%	93%
Scotland	104	10%	14%	76%
Total/Average	15,821	21%	22%	57%

**Aspects of independence: working conditions**

22a. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Pay, pensions, retirement age

22a	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	739	7%	5%	88%
Belgium	457	21%	9%	70%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	329	12%	10%	78%
Bulgaria	417	11%	11%	79%
Croatia	517	19%	9%	72%
Cyprus	60	17%	2%	82%
Czech Republic	378	22%	11%	67%
Denmark	210	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	67	24%	0%	76%
Finland	227	4%	7%	90%
France	1,571	17%	9%	74%
Germany	3,131	11%	7%	82%
Greece	823	11%	7%	82%
Hungary	786	9%	8%	83%
Ireland	115	6%	4%	90%
Italy	415	6%	6%	88%
Latvia	200	24%	15%	62%
Lithuania	179	61%	11%	28%
Montenegro	100	28%	10%	62%
Netherlands	774	2%	2%	96%
Norway	314	4%	4%	93%
Portugal	490	19%	14%	67%
Slovakia	67	31%	10%	58%
Slovenia	192	39%	15%	46%
Spain	1,181	41%	12%	47%
Sweden	598	10%	6%	84%
England and Wales	1,271	12%	6%	82%
Northern Ireland	27	11%	7%	81%
Scotland	104	17%	6%	77%
Total/Average	15,739	17%	8%	75%

22b. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Working hours

22b	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	738	13%	6%	81%
Belgium	452	18%	7%	75%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	326	8%	10%	83%
Bulgaria	418	7%	7%	86%
Croatia	516	13%	6%	81%
Cyprus	60	3%	3%	93%
Czech Republic	375	2%	3%	94%
Denmark	210	3%	1%	96%
Estonia	67	21%	7%	72%
Finland	226	8%	6%	86%
France	1,571	37%	10%	53%
Germany	3,120	13%	7%	79%
Greece	824	17%	8%	74%
Hungary	785	8%	5%	88%
Ireland	115	12%	3%	84%
Italy	413	14%	4%	81%
Latvia	200	8%	11%	82%
Lithuania	180	33%	13%	53%
Montenegro	98	15%	7%	78%
Netherlands	770	4%	3%	93%
Norway	312	6%	5%	89%
Portugal	491	25%	14%	60%
Slovakia	66	6%	9%	85%
Slovenia	192	6%	7%	87%
Spain	1,183	47%	10%	42%
Sweden	599	9%	5%	86%
England and Wales	1,270	10%	5%	85%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	7%	85%
Scotland	104	8%	3%	89%
Total/Average	15,708	13%	7%	80%

22c. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Caseload

22c	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	738	23%	13%	64%
Belgium	457	28%	7%	65%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	333	24%	8%	68%
Bulgaria	418	26%	12%	62%
Croatia	518	37%	8%	55%
Cyprus	60	13%	7%	80%
Czech Republic	375	3%	5%	93%
Denmark	209	5%	1%	94%
Estonia	67	31%	6%	63%
Finland	227	15%	8%	77%
France	1,574	46%	10%	44%
Germany	3,121	22%	14%	64%
Greece	821	25%	9%	66%
Hungary	784	18%	8%	74%
Ireland	115	16%	3%	82%
Italy	418	29%	5%	67%
Latvia	200	24%	15%	62%
Lithuania	179	47%	14%	39%
Montenegro	99	15%	10%	75%
Netherlands	775	6%	6%	88%
Norway	313	7%	8%	85%
Portugal	491	29%	15%	56%
Slovakia	67	31%	10%	58%
Slovenia	190	11%	16%	73%
Spain	1,185	54%	9%	37%
Sweden	596	15%	5%	80%
England and Wales	1,265	12%	5%	83%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	7%	85%
Scotland	103	9%	2%	89%
Total/Average	15,725	22%	9%	70%

22d. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Court Resources

22d	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	739	23%	14%	64%
Belgium	457	34%	12%	54%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	331	21%	10%	70%
Bulgaria	418	19%	15%	66%
Croatia	521	38%	9%	53%
Cyprus	60	13%	12%	75%
Czech Republic	377	8%	11%	80%
Denmark	210	8%	1%	91%
Estonia	67	34%	7%	58%
Finland	227	21%	7%	71%
France	1,573	42%	12%	47%
Germany	3,128	21%	13%	67%
Greece	821	21%	12%	67%
Hungary	787	19%	15%	67%
Ireland	115	16%	12%	72%
Italy	419	33%	6%	60%
Latvia	200	26%	21%	54%
Lithuania	179	52%	14%	34%
Montenegro	98	20%	10%	69%
Netherlands	774	8%	11%	81%
Norway	314	11%	14%	75%
Portugal	490	21%	14%	65%
Slovakia	66	26%	18%	56%
Slovenia	191	34%	15%	52%
Spain	1,172	20%	13%	66%
Sweden	596	14%	10%	76%
England and Wales	1,268	18%	7%	75%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	22%	70%
Scotland	102	12%	4%	84%
Total/Average	15,727	22%	12%	66%

22e. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Digitalization

22e	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	738	13%	12%	75%
Belgium	454	23%	14%	62%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	328	12%	9%	78%
Bulgaria	417	23%	15%	63%
Croatia	518	18%	12%	70%
Cyprus	60	10%	5%	85%
Czech Republic	378	5%	12%	83%
Denmark	210	3%	2%	94%
Estonia	67	15%	10%	75%
Finland	227	10%	9%	81%
France	1,569	22%	17%	61%
Germany	3,130	19%	14%	67%
Greece	821	8%	8%	84%
Hungary	784	13%	12%	75%
Ireland	115	8%	14%	78%
Italy	416	16%	11%	73%
Latvia	199	38%	24%	38%
Lithuania	177	22%	18%	60%
Montenegro	99	14%	15%	71%
Netherlands	775	5%	7%	88%
Norway	312	6%	7%	87%
Portugal	490	22%	13%	65%
Slovakia	67	22%	27%	51%
Slovenia	192	11%	18%	70%
Spain	1,173	29%	12%	58%
Sweden	597	9%	7%	84%
England and Wales	1,269	12%	8%	81%
Northern Ireland	27	7%	11%	81%
Scotland	102	11%	6%	83%
Total/Average	15,711	15%	12%	73%

22f. During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category:

Conduct at work (including sexual harassment and discrimination)

22f	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	4%	4%	91%
Belgium	456	5%	4%	91%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	6%	8%	86%
Bulgaria	419	5%	5%	90%
Croatia	521	30%	9%	61%
Cyprus	60	2%	2%	97%
Czech Republic	378	2%	2%	95%
Denmark	209	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	67	10%	3%	87%
Finland	227	4%	4%	91%
France	1,572	12%	7%	81%
Germany	3,133	4%	4%	92%
Greece	822	7%	6%	87%
Hungary	786	11%	7%	81%
Ireland	115	3%	6%	91%
Italy	417	7%	5%	88%
Latvia	200	13%	13%	75%
Lithuania	180	7%	11%	82%
Montenegro	98	5%	6%	89%
Netherlands	774	3%	1%	96%
Norway	311	3%	2%	95%
Portugal	488	7%	7%	86%
Slovakia	66	8%	8%	85%
Slovenia	191	13%	9%	78%
Spain	1,182	7%	8%	86%
Sweden	598	3%	3%	93%
England and Wales	1,271	3%	5%	92%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	4%	96%
Scotland	103	6%	3%	91%
Total/Average	15,741	7%	5%	88%

### Accountability

23. In my country, I believe that judges adhere to high ethical standards

23	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	84%	12%	4%
Belgium	457	93%	6%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	56%	35%	9%
Bulgaria	424	63%	31%	6%
Croatia	525	64%	30%	6%
Cyprus	60	90%	7%	3%
Czech Republic	378	75%	22%	2%
Denmark	211	98%	0%	2%
Estonia	67	90%	6%	4%
Finland	227	93%	3%	4%
France	1,583	89%	6%	5%
Germany	3,140	87%	10%	4%
Greece	826	54%	32%	14%
Hungary	788	71%	22%	7%
Ireland	115	97%	1%	3%
Italy	423	72%	13%	15%
Latvia	200	72%	25%	3%
Lithuania	181	79%	15%	6%
Montenegro	100	80%	18%	2%
Netherlands	775	95%	4%	1%
Norway	315	94%	3%	3%
Portugal	494	86%	11%	3%
Slovakia	67	64%	34%	1%
Slovenia	193	66%	26%	8%
Spain	1,191	81%	14%	5%
Sweden	599	96%	3%	1%
England and Wales	1,273	95%	1%	4%
Northern Ireland	27	96%	0%	4%
Scotland	104	96%	1%	3%
Total/Average	15,821	82%	13%	5%

24. In my country, I believe that judicial misconduct is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities

24	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	59%	30%	11%
Belgium	457	59%	29%	12%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	38%	42%	20%
Bulgaria	424	36%	46%	19%
Croatia	525	42%	38%	19%
Cyprus	60	82%	10%	8%
Czech Republic	378	85%	14%	1%
Denmark	211	93%	6%	1%
Estonia	67	81%	12%	7%
Finland	227	83%	12%	4%
France	1,583	45%	26%	29%
Germany	3,140	66%	26%	8%
Greece	826	51%	33%	16%
Hungary	788	62%	28%	9%
Ireland	115	51%	38%	10%
Italy	423	77%	9%	14%
Latvia	200	73%	24%	3%
Lithuania	181	66%	27%	8%
Montenegro	100	57%	35%	8%
Netherlands	775	80%	18%	2%
Norway	315	88%	10%	2%
Portugal	494	66%	20%	15%
Slovakia	67	33%	37%	30%
Slovenia	193	43%	37%	20%
Spain	1,191	35%	36%	29%
Sweden	599	83%	13%	4%
England and Wales	1,273	79%	16%	5%
Northern Ireland	27	89%	7%	4%
Scotland	104	70%	24%	6%
Total/Average	15,821	65%	24%	11%

25. In my country judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities

25	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	740	69%	26%	5%
Belgium	457	67%	28%	5%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	25%	45%	30%
Bulgaria	424	27%	52%	21%
Croatia	525	35%	43%	22%
Cyprus	60	83%	17%	0%
Czech Republic	378	87%	11%	1%
Denmark	211	86%	14%	0%
Estonia	67	85%	9%	6%
Finland	227	69%	30%	2%
France	1,583	75%	17%	8%
Germany	3,140	81%	16%	3%
Greece	826	55%	34%	11%
Hungary	788	72%	22%	6%
Ireland	115	67%	30%	3%
Italy	423	79%	10%	10%
Latvia	200	66%	31%	4%
Lithuania	181	66%	28%	6%
Montenegro	100	52%	42%	6%
Netherlands	775	78%	21%	1%
Norway	315	93%	6%	1%
Portugal	494	66%	21%	12%
Slovakia	67	36%	43%	21%
Slovenia	193	46%	43%	11%
Spain	1,191	68%	23%	9%
Sweden	599	80%	18%	2%
England and Wales	1,273	85%	13%	2%
Northern Ireland	27	93%	7%	0%
Scotland	104	85%	15%	0%
Total/Average	15,821	68%	25%	7%

**Respect for independence of judges**

26a. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Association of judges	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	733	97%	2%	1%
Belgium	404	94%	5%	1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	328	85%	11%	4%
Bulgaria	402	67%	25%	7%
Croatia	488	87%	9%	5%
Cyprus	57	95%	0%	5%
Czech Republic	337	96%	1%	3%
Denmark	208	98%	0%	1%
Estonia	67	84%	12%	4%
Finland	226	96%	3%	1%
France	1,270	93%	3%	4%
Germany	3,007	96%	2%	1%
Greece	816	92%	6%	3%
Hungary	785	82%	5%	13%
Ireland	114	96%	0%	4%
Italy	403	80%	7%	12%
Latvia	198	89%	8%	3%
Lithuania	181	81%	13%	7%
Montenegro	95	84%	8%	7%
Netherlands	720	98%	1%	0%
Norway	292	97%	1%	2%
Portugal	492	89%	5%	6%
Slovakia	63	89%	8%	3%
Slovenia	160	93%	5%	3%
Spain	1,095	91%	4%	5%
Sweden	555	90%	7%	2%
England and Wales	1,088	88%	10%	2%
Northern Ireland	23	96%	4%	0%
Scotland	80	93%	6%	1%
Total/Average	14,687	90%	6%	4%

26b. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Constitutional Court	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	725	96%	2%	2%
Belgium	412	93%	5%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	89%	9%	2%
Bulgaria	407	79%	18%	2%
Croatia	509	84%	11%	5%
Cyprus *)	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	353	94%	3%	4%
Denmark *)	-	-	-	-
Estonia *)	-	-	-	-
Finland *)	-	-	-	-
France	1,241	90%	5%	4%
Germany	3,085	94%	4%	3%
Greece	342	91%	6%	3%
Hungary	786	68%	18%	14%
Ireland *)	-	-	-	-
Italy	379	86%	8%	6%
Latvia	199	89%	8%	3%
Lithuania	181	88%	9%	3%
Montenegro *)	-	-	-	-
Netherlands *)	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	-
Portugal	489	86%	11%	3%
Slovakia	65	91%	3%	6%
Slovenia	166	87%	10%	2%
Spain	1,032	86%	8%	6%
Sweden *)	-	-	-	-
England and Wales *)	-	-	-	-
Northern Ireland *)	-	-	-	-
Scotland *)	-	-	-	-
Total/Average	10,701	88%	8%	4%

\*) country has no Constitutional Court

26c. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Council for the Judiciary	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria *	-	-	-	-
Belgium	426	86%	8%	6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	319	85%	12%	3%
Bulgaria	418	53%	25%	22%
Croatia	502	84%	10%	6%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic *	-	-	-	-
Denmark	204	93%	3%	4%
Estonia *	-	-	-	-
Finland	226	92%	5%	4%
France	1,463	94%	3%	3%
Germany *	-	-	-	-
Greece	809	90%	8%	2%
Hungary	785	77%	8%	16%
Ireland	113	88%	7%	5%
Italy	408	74%	10%	16%
Latvia	199	80%	13%	7%
Lithuania	181	74%	17%	9%
Montenegro	99	85%	10%	5%
Netherlands	756	86%	10%	4%
Norway	304	84%	9%	7%
Portugal	492	74%	12%	15%
Slovakia	65	52%	25%	23%
Slovenia	180	76%	19%	5%
Spain	1,143	63%	16%	21%
Sweden *	594	78%	13%	9%
England and Wales	790	80%	18%	2%
Northern Ireland	24	96%	4%	0%
Scotland	61	79%	16%	5%
Total/Average	10,561	80%	12%	8%

\*) country has no Council for the Judiciary

26d. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Court Management	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	735	84%	8%	8%
Belgium	454	88%	5%	7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	336	85%	7%	9%
Bulgaria	420	81%	11%	7%
Croatia	519	83%	8%	8%
Cyprus	55	98%	0%	2%
Czech Republic	372	92%	4%	4%
Denmark	203	98%	1%	1%
Estonia	67	88%	4%	7%
Finland	227	93%	2%	5%
France	1,558	84%	8%	8%
Germany	3,122	88%	6%	6%
Greece	822	88%	6%	5%
Hungary	785	79%	7%	14%
Ireland	113	88%	6%	6%
Italy	419	80%	7%	13%
Latvia	200	73%	16%	12%
Lithuania	181	75%	14%	12%
Montenegro	100	83%	11%	6%
Netherlands	766	92%	5%	4%
Norway	304	95%	2%	4%
Portugal	486	73%	13%	14%
Slovakia	66	88%	8%	5%
Slovenia	189	80%	11%	10%
Spain	1,158	78%	10%	12%
Sweden	592	89%	4%	7%
England and Wales	1,206	88%	7%	5%
Northern Ireland	25	88%	8%	4%
Scotland	99	84%	8%	8%
Total/Average	15,579	86%	7%	7%

26d. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Government	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	720	39%	28%	33%
Belgium	437	57%	22%	22%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	315	69%	20%	11%
Bulgaria	409	22%	32%	45%
Croatia	485	68%	19%	13%
Cyprus	53	79%	13%	8%
Czech Republic	327	52%	22%	26%
Denmark	205	91%	5%	4%
Estonia	67	58%	25%	16%
Finland	227	89%	6%	5%
France	1,433	29%	22%	49%
Germany	3,104	79%	13%	7%
Greece	795	62%	21%	17%
Hungary	788	46%	17%	38%
Ireland	115	84%	9%	7%
Italy	396	51%	17%	32%
Latvia	199	34%	31%	35%
Lithuania	179	25%	32%	43%
Montenegro	95	64%	20%	16%
Netherlands	756	74%	17%	10%
Norway	285	90%	7%	3%
Portugal	486	57%	21%	22%
Slovakia	62	26%	27%	47%
Slovenia	168	23%	23%	54%
Spain	1,112	44%	12%	45%
Sweden	584	85%	9%	6%
England and Wales	1,265	40%	18%	42%
Northern Ireland	27	41%	26%	33%
Scotland	103	48%	18%	34%
Total/Average	15,197	56%	19%	25%

26e. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Lawyers	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	738	82%	12%	6%
Belgium	449	84%	10%	6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	336	72%	18%	10%
Bulgaria	418	55%	28%	17%
Croatia	515	74%	16%	10%
Cyprus	58	74%	17%	9%
Czech Republic	347	79%	17%	4%
Denmark	208	97%	1%	2%
Estonia	67	81%	18%	1%
Finland	227	93%	4%	4%
France	1,550	70%	15%	15%
Germany	3,127	85%	11%	5%
Greece	822	71%	17%	13%
Hungary	787	76%	13%	10%
Ireland	115	96%	1%	3%
Italy	414	63%	14%	23%
Latvia	197	60%	29%	11%
Lithuania	181	46%	38%	16%
Montenegro	96	77%	16%	7%
Netherlands	771	91%	7%	2%
Norway	311	96%	3%	1%
Portugal	493	69%	18%	13%
Slovakia	67	58%	22%	19%
Slovenia	188	69%	19%	12%
Spain	1,158	72%	14%	14%
Sweden	595	89%	6%	5%
England and Wales	1,267	91%	5%	4%
Northern Ireland	27	85%	11%	4%
Scotland	103	94%	2%	4%
Total/Average	15,632	78%	14%	9%

26f. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Media	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	727	49%	27%	24%
Belgium	424	59%	23%	18%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	329	55%	27%	18%
Bulgaria	412	24%	33%	43%
Croatia	495	47%	22%	31%
Cyprus	53	53%	23%	25%
Czech Republic	333	56%	27%	17%
Denmark	208	87%	6%	7%
Estonia	67	61%	19%	19%
Finland	227	82%	9%	9%
France	1,451	30%	24%	47%
Germany	3,083	57%	28%	16%
Greece	791	50%	25%	25%
Hungary	787	34%	19%	47%
Ireland	115	74%	12%	14%
Italy	410	36%	14%	50%
Latvia	197	24%	41%	36%
Lithuania	181	10%	40%	49%
Montenegro	94	46%	33%	21%
Netherlands	755	65%	23%	12%
Norway	300	93%	6%	1%
Portugal	484	40%	23%	37%
Slovakia	62	18%	26%	56%
Slovenia	175	31%	30%	38%
Spain	1,137	39%	15%	46%
Sweden	593	77%	13%	9%
England and Wales	1,264	36%	24%	40%
Northern Ireland	27	44%	33%	22%
Scotland	103	46%	22%	32%
Total/Average	15,284	49%	23%	28%

26g. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Parliament	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	721	54%	28%	18%
Belgium	423	63%	20%	16%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	311	63%	24%	12%
Bulgaria	408	24%	34%	42%
Croatia	480	62%	21%	17%
Cyprus	51	63%	14%	24%
Czech Republic	326	55%	20%	25%
Denmark	206	86%	5%	9%
Estonia	67	63%	30%	7%
Finland	226	87%	8%	5%
France	1,393	37%	24%	39%
Germany	3,085	79%	14%	7%
Greece	784	60%	23%	17%
Hungary	787	51%	17%	32%
Ireland	115	82%	9%	10%
Italy	396	47%	17%	36%
Latvia	198	33%	37%	30%
Lithuania	181	17%	31%	52%
Montenegro	92	60%	23%	17%
Netherlands	750	56%	27%	18%
Norway	278	90%	8%	3%
Portugal	483	54%	24%	22%
Slovakia	62	27%	21%	52%
Slovenia	161	35%	29%	36%
Spain	1,059	45%	13%	43%
Sweden	581	88%	8%	5%
England and Wales	1,262	46%	23%	31%
Northern Ireland	27	44%	33%	22%
Scotland	103	41%	25%	34%
Total/Average	15,016	56%	21%	23%

26h. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Parties in procedures	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	736	83%	12%	5%
Belgium	450	78%	12%	10%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	329	64%	23%	13%
Bulgaria	419	58%	28%	14%
Croatia	517	61%	21%	18%
Cyprus	56	75%	14%	11%
Czech Republic	375	77%	16%	7%
Denmark	209	96%	2%	2%
Estonia	67	81%	9%	10%
Finland	227	86%	6%	8%
France	1,525	72%	15%	13%
Germany	3,120	83%	13%	4%
Greece	821	75%	18%	7%
Hungary	787	77%	13%	10%
Ireland	115	81%	9%	10%
Italy	417	68%	15%	17%
Latvia	196	26%	44%	30%
Lithuania	181	46%	36%	17%
Montenegro	96	74%	19%	7%
Netherlands	769	88%	9%	4%
Norway	311	93%	6%	1%
Portugal	492	67%	21%	12%
Slovakia	67	60%	25%	15%
Slovenia	183	49%	25%	26%
Spain	1,152	77%	12%	11%
Sweden	595	84%	8%	8%
England and Wales	1,261	75%	14%	11%
Northern Ireland	26	65%	19%	15%
Scotland	103	77%	17%	7%
Total/Average	15,602	72%	17%	11%

26i. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Prosecution	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	629	90%	8%	2%
Belgium	434	90%	6%	4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	81%	16%	3%
Bulgaria	418	66%	24%	10%
Croatia	497	84%	12%	4%
Cyprus	55	89%	5%	5%
Czech Republic	335	92%	4%	4%
Denmark	208	98%	0%	1%
Estonia	49	69%	24%	6%
Finland	198	86%	11%	3%
France	1,519	86%	7%	8%
Germany	2,685	93%	5%	2%
Greece	729	90%	8%	2%
Hungary	781	81%	13%	6%
Ireland	115	93%	3%	3%
Italy	381	79%	12%	9%
Latvia	194	77%	18%	5%
Lithuania	169	71%	22%	7%
Montenegro	93	84%	13%	3%
Netherlands	542	96%	4%	1%
Norway	304	97%	2%	1%
Portugal	489	85%	9%	6%
Slovakia	64	84%	8%	8%
Slovenia	166	88%	10%	2%
Spain	1,123	89%	6%	6%
Sweden	476	93%	3%	3%
England and Wales	1,031	76%	21%	3%
Northern Ireland	23	83%	9%	9%
Scotland	83	82%	11%	7%
Total/Average	14,120	85%	10%	5%

26j. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Social media	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	686	25%	39%	36%
Belgium	406	51%	30%	19%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	304	50%	32%	17%
Bulgaria	398	19%	44%	37%
Croatia	477	42%	31%	27%
Cyprus	51	47%	27%	25%
Czech Republic	291	38%	48%	13%
Denmark	178	61%	30%	9%
Estonia	66	39%	38%	23%
Finland	223	57%	29%	14%
France	1,305	25%	29%	45%
Germany	2,956	34%	40%	25%
Greece	763	47%	32%	21%
Hungary	784	33%	27%	40%
Ireland	115	34%	41%	25%
Italy	395	32%	29%	38%
Latvia	192	27%	45%	28%
Lithuania	177	12%	51%	37%
Montenegro	88	48%	34%	18%
Netherlands	708	35%	36%	28%
Norway	258	66%	31%	2%
Portugal	477	35%	31%	33%
Slovakia	61	18%	39%	43%
Slovenia	147	19%	30%	51%
Spain	1,082	38%	23%	39%
Sweden	574	54%	31%	15%
England and Wales	1,243	19%	45%	36%
Northern Ireland	26	23%	54%	23%
Scotland	103	22%	52%	25%
Total/Average	14,534	36%	36%	27%

26k. During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:

Supreme Court / Court of Cassation	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	721	95%	3%	2%
Belgium	420	95%	3%	1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	327	89%	9%	2%
Bulgaria	417	79%	18%	3%
Croatia	516	87%	10%	3%
Cyprus	56	95%	2%	4%
Czech Republic	349	94%	3%	4%
Denmark	198	98%	1%	2%
Estonia	66	83%	8%	9%
Finland	224	95%	3%	2%
France	1,415	94%	2%	3%
Germany	3,042	93%	4%	2%
Greece	800	86%	11%	3%
Hungary	783	76%	11%	12%
Ireland	114	96%	0%	4%
Italy	385	82%	11%	7%
Latvia	199	81%	12%	7%
Lithuania	180	89%	9%	2%
Montenegro	96	89%	7%	4%
Netherlands	711	99%	1%	1%
Norway	297	98%	1%	1%
Portugal	485	86%	10%	5%
Slovakia	65	83%	14%	3%
Slovenia	182	82%	15%	3%
Spain	1,084	85%	9%	7%
Sweden	584	95%	2%	2%
England and Wales	1,229	90%	8%	3%
Northern Ireland	26	77%	15%	8%
Scotland	101	91%	7%	2%
Total/Average	15,072	89%	7%	4%

## Personal and professional characteristics of respondents

### 27. Gender

Gender	Response	Did not answer / Identify differently	Male	Female
Austria	730	1%	48%	52%
Belgium	451	1%	45%	55%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	0%	35%	65%
Bulgaria	422	0%	36%	64%
Croatia	524	0%	27%	73%
Cyprus	60	0%	48%	52%
Czech Republic	377	0%	50%	50%
Denmark	210	0%	51%	49%
Estonia	66	1%	33%	67%
Finland	221	3%	43%	57%
France	1,564	1%	33%	67%
Germany	3,119	1%	55%	45%
Greece	816	1%	29%	71%
Hungary	745	5%	38%	62%
Ireland	115	0%	57%	43%
Italy	421	0%	53%	47%
Latvia	198	1%	19%	81%
Lithuania	180	1%	37%	63%
Montenegro	96	4%	31%	69%
Netherlands	771	1%	45%	55%
Norway	315	0%	56%	44%
Portugal	491	1%	38%	62%
Slovakia	66	1%	56%	44%
Slovenia	192	1%	19%	81%
Spain	1,170	2%	53%	47%
Sweden	597	0%	48%	52%
England and Wales	1,251	2%	63%	37%
Northern Ireland	27	0%	81%	19%
Scotland	103	1%	63%	37%
Total/Average	15,636	1%	45%	55%

### 28. Years of experience as a judge

Judicial experience	Response	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years
Austria	740	11%	19%	11%	15%	15%	30%
Belgium	457	26%	19%	16%	12%	15%	12%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	13%	16%	22%	12%	14%	24%
Bulgaria	424	9%	9%	15%	14%	28%	25%
Croatia	525	7%	9%	14%	13%	23%	34%
Cyprus	60	37%	18%	15%	13%	13%	3%
Czech Republic	378	19%	11%	10%	19%	16%	26%
Denmark	211	24%	14%	27%	16%	12%	8%
Estonia	67	10%	24%	12%	24%	10%	19%
Finland	227	33%	23%	15%	7%	7%	14%
France	1,583	23%	13%	12%	15%	11%	27%
Germany	3,140	17%	11%	15%	13%	14%	30%
Greece	826	18%	28%	14%	14%	14%	12%
Hungary	788	12%	12%	16%	16%	18%	26%
Ireland	115	39%	36%	15%	5%	3%	3%
Italy	423	22%	10%	8%	6%	9%	45%
Latvia	200	11%	14%	18%	22%	13%	23%
Lithuania	181	18%	20%	14%	17%	15%	15%
Montenegro	100	17%	22%	19%	16%	7%	19%
Netherlands	775	18%	13%	19%	17%	15%	18%
Norway	315	30%	20%	19%	13%	9%	10%
Portugal	494	9%	5%	15%	17%	20%	33%
Slovakia	67	39%	12%	7%	16%	12%	13%
Slovenia	193	11%	6%	19%	19%	17%	28%
Spain	1,191	8%	9%	14%	13%	17%	39%
Sweden	599	23%	19%	27%	15%	7%	10%
England and Wales	1,273	28%	18%	22%	15%	10%	7%
Northern Ireland	27	22%	30%	11%	11%	11%	15%
Scotland	104	22%	24%	20%	17%	9%	8%
Total/Average	15,821	20%	17%	16%	15%	13%	20%

29. Primary place of work

Type of court	Respos	Court of first instance	Appeal court	Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation
Austria	740	64%	31%	5%
Belgium	457	84%	16%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	73%	23%	4%
Bulgaria	424	75%	17%	8%
Croatia	525	67%	31%	2%
Cyprus	60	100%	0%	0%
Czech Republic	378	72%	21%	7%
Denmark	211	69%	26%	5%
Estonia	67	69%	21%	10%
Finland	227	58%	37%	5%
France	1,583	75%	21%	3%
Germany	3,140	76%	20%	4%
Greece	826	75%	19%	7%
Hungary	788	71%	25%	4%
Ireland	115	82%	12%	6%
Italy	423	82%	17%	1%
Latvia	200	68%	24%	9%
Lithuania	181	60%	32%	8%
Montenegro	100	89%	9%	2%
Netherlands	775	76%	23%	0%
Norway	315	64%	33%	3%
Portugal	494	75%	22%	3%
Slovakia	67	69%	27%	4%
Slovenia	193	80%	18%	2%
Spain	1,191	68%	30%	2%
Sweden	599	66%	31%	3%
England and Wales	1,273	94%	6%	0%
Northern Ireland	27	96%	4%	0%
Scotland	104	88%	12%	0%
Total/Average	15,821	75%	21%	4%

30. Primary field of work

Type of cases	Response	administrative cases	civil (including family) cases	criminal cases	civil and criminal cases in equal measure	civil, administrative and criminal cases in equal measure
Austria	740	22%	61%	13%	3%	1%
Belgium	457	2%	58%	27%	11%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	5%	58%	23%	10%	4%
Bulgaria	424	18%	42%	26%	6%	7%
Croatia	525	7%	66%	27%	0%	0%
Cyprus	60	8%	17%	15%	60%	0%
Czech Republic	378	8%	65%	27%	0%	0%
Denmark	211	1%	3%	9%	52%	36%
Estonia	67	25%	45%	27%	3%	0%
Finland	227	31%	19%	15%	34%	1%
France	1,583	2%	48%	34%	14%	2%
Germany	3,140	28%	46%	21%	4%	0%
Greece	826	62%	11%	3%	24%	0%
Hungary	788	8%	52%	38%	1%	0%
Ireland	115	4%	37%	30%	14%	15%
Italy	423	10%	41%	46%	2%	0%
Latvia	200	15%	51%	31%	3%	1%
Lithuania	181	8%	44%	27%	3%	18%
Montenegro	100	6%	45%	36%	12%	1%
Netherlands	775	22%	42%	30%	5%	1%
Norway	315	0%	4%	2%	77%	18%
Portugal	494	5%	47%	35%	13%	1%
Slovakia	67	13%	60%	27%	0%	0%
Slovenia	193	5%	67%	24%	4%	1%
Spain	1,191	11%	38%	29%	21%	1%
Sweden	599	41%	9%	19%	29%	2%
England and Wales	1,273	20%	53%	22%	3%	3%
Northern Ireland	27	11%	44%	26%	7%	11%
Scotland	104	16%	26%	18%	31%	9%
Total/Average	15,821	14%	41%	24%	15%	5%

## 31. Membership of a judges' association

<b>Member of a judges association</b>	<b>Response</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>no</b>
Austria	740	96%	4%
Belgium	457	36%	64%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	338	76%	24%
Bulgaria	424	33%	67%
Croatia	525	65%	35%
Cyprus	60	92%	8%
Czech Republic	378	32%	68%
Denmark	211	100%	0%
Estonia	67	81%	19%
Finland	227	62%	38%
France	1,583	46%	54%
Germany	3,140	70%	30%
Greece	826	97%	3%
Hungary	788	46%	54%
Ireland	115	97%	3%
Italy	423	91%	9%
Latvia	200	51%	49%
Lithuania	181	62%	38%
Montenegro	100	69%	31%
Netherlands	775	64%	36%
Norway	315	92%	8%
Portugal	494	88%	12%
Slovakia	67	42%	58%
Slovenia	193	67%	33%
Spain	1,191	64%	36%
Sweden	599	29%	71%
England and Wales	1,273	59%	41%
Northern Ireland	27	89%	11%
Scotland	104	63%	37%
<b>Total/Average</b>	<b>15,821</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>32%</b>